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عدد المساهمات : 19001 التقييم : 35505 تاريخ التسجيل : 01/07/2009 الدولة : مصر العمل : مدير منتدى هندسة الإنتاج والتصميم الميكانيكى
| موضوع: كتاب International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis الإثنين 03 مايو 2021, 12:58 am | |
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أخوانى فى الله أحضرت لكم كتاب International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis Daniel Johnston
و المحتوى كما يلي :
CONTENTS Acknowledgments Introduction 1 International Petroleum Fiscal Systems—PSCs 2 State-of-the-Art in Petroleum Fiscal System Analysis 3 Thinking of Going International? Some UsefulTips 4 Trends and Issues in Foreign PSCs 5 Current Developments in PSCs 6 The International Gas Industry 7 Key Concerns of Governments and Oil Companies— Alignment of Interests 8 Fiscal System Design—the Ideal System 9 Economic Auditing/Modeling—Art and Science, Part I 10 Economic Auditing/Modeling— Art and Science, Part II 177 11 Finger on the Puls 12 Kashagan and Tengiz—Castor and Pollux 13 The Bidding Dilemma—a 20-Year Retrospective 14 Retrospective, Government Take—Not a Perfect Statistic 237 15 Additional Commentary on Key Issues 16 Sample Contracts & Summaries Glossary Abbreviations and Acronyms Index Phuket 2001 Abbreviations and acronyms, 369-373 Access to gross revenues (AGR), 30, 58, 66-69, 72-74, 96, 100-102: calculation, 101-102 Accounting. SEE Cash flow/cash flow analysis. Acetic acid, 126 Acquisitions, 85, 255-259: international, 85, 256-259; U.S., 255-259 Acronyms and abbreviations, 369-373 After-tax equity split, 59 Algeria, 197 Alignment of interests, 133-147, 172: boundary conditions, 134; culture , 135; objectives, 135; policy, 136; strategy/tactics, 136- 137; fiscal system example, 137; division of profits, 138; government take calculation, 139-140, 143-144; effective royalty' rate calculation , 140-142; • effect of savings, 142; marginal government take calculation, 143-144; maximum efficient rate, 144-146; references, 147 375International Exploration Economics. Risk, a n d Contract Anal/sis Allocation mechanism , 152 Ammonia, 121 , 126 Angola, 196, 282 Arbitration clause, 240 Argentina, 42, 86 Asia economic crisis, 1 24-125 ASR 289, 261 Association contract, 285 Auditing (economic model), 159-188: economic model example, 160-175; discussion, 165; veracity of model, 165; government profit oil share, 165-168; field production profile, 168-175; government take, 169-170; effective royalty rate, 170-172 ; savings index, 172-173; entitlement index, 173-174; spot checks, 174; cost recovery limit, 174; taxation, 174-175; company cash flow , 175; conclusion, 176, 188; initial oil price, 177-178; capital cost per unit, 179; exploration well costs, 179-180; capital costs per BOPD, 180-181; capital costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; total costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; operating costs (peak year)/ totaJ capital costs, 181-182; operating costs (early years), 182; Operating costs (full cycle), 182-183; technical aspects/assumptions, 183-188 Australia, 50, 73, 87 Authorization for expenditure (AFE), 88, 143 Azerbaijan, 50, 283 B Bangladesh, 126 Barrels of oil equivalent, 266 Barrels under service agreements, 267 Basic unit of production, 21 Bid /bidding, 3, 136, 192, 219-236: dilemma, 219-236; examples, 225-233 376Glossary Bidding dilemma, 219-236: history, 220-222; post mortem analysis, 220-222; oil price estimates, 222; eost/ timing estimates, 223; prospect sizes, 223-224; success ratio, 224-233; examples, 225-233; conclusions, 233-234; references, 234-236 Bidding efficiency, 234 Block offers, 112 Bonus bidding, 3, 225-227, 229-233: signature type, 225-227; combination with terms, 229-230; highest bonus, 230-233 Bonus, 3, 15-16, 25, 30-32, 58-59, 72, 100, 153-154, 191-192, 225-227, 229-233: bidding, 3, 225-227, 229-233 Book-end-loaded contract system, 206 Booking (reserves recognition), 101 Booking barrels, 173-174, 247, 259-260, 265-269: barrels of oil equivalent, 266; imputed entitlement barrels, 266; barrels under service agreements, 267 Booking fuel, 265-266: imputed entitlement barrels/taxes in lieu, 266 Booking gas plant liquids, 267 Booking reserves, 101, 173-174, 194-195, 214 Booking royalty oil, 266 BOPD/foot of pay, 187-188 Bottom-line income split, 133 Boundary conditions, 1 34 Brazil , 247 Bright spots, 265 Buyback contract, 304-305 Buybacks, 194, 198, 244, 304- 305: buyback contract, 304-305 C California, 196 Canada, 195 Capital costs, 25, 121 , 129, 179-182: per unit, 179; per BOPD, 180-181; percentage of gross revenues, 181 377International Exploration Economics,Risk, and Contract Analysis Capital expenditures (CAPEX), 42 Carry forward (C/ F), 20, 22-23, 25, 32 , 34: tax losses, 20, 22-23, 25 Cash flow model, 254, 271 Cash flow/ cash flow analysis, 18-19, 20-26, 30-40, 47-49, 61 , 63-64, 159-188, 251-254, 271: company, 175; model, 254, 271 Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), 204 Chance factor, 110, 224 Changes (fiscal system analysis), 74: government take vs. state take, 74; access to gross revenues, 74; other metrics, 74 Cheating/cost control, 143-144 China, 55, 87, 122, 284 Classification (petroleum fiscal regimes), 10-11 Climate (Kazakhstan), 205 Coal-fired power plant, 125 Colombia, 53, 150, 196, 247-248, 285-286 Combination bidding (bonus and terms), 229-230 Combined-cycle power generation, 125 Commentary, 56, 73-74, 92, 106, 113, 130-131: petroleum fiscal systems, 56; petroleum fiscal system international operations, 92; trends^ and issues, developments, 113; gas resource system design, 156-157 Commercial terms (Kazakhstan), 206-211: Kashagan field, 206-209; R factor, 209-210; internal rate of return, 210; volume factor, 211 Company cash flow, 175 Company evaluation, 88-89 Company strategy, 233-234: bidding efficiency, 234 Company take, 20, 27-28, 32-33, 53-56, 58-60, 72, 99, 151-152, 227-228 Competition, 1 1 1 - 1 12, 219-236: bidding dilemma, 219-236; competitive bidding examples, 225-233 Competitive bidding (examples), 225-233: signature bonus bidding, 225-227; terms bidding, 227-228; combination bidding (bonus and terms), 229 - 230; highest bonus bidding, 230-233 analysis, 73-74; 106; PSC development, 130-131; fiscal 378Glossary Complement of government take, 27 Compound uplifting, 46, 50 Concerns (governments/companies), 133-147: boundary conditions, 134; culture, 135; objectives, 135; policy, 136; strategy/ tactics, 136-137; alignment of interests, 137-138; government take calculation , 139-140, 143-144; effective royalty rate calculation, 140-142; effect of savings, 42; marginal government take calculation, 143-144; maximum efficient rate, 144-146; references , 147 Concessionary systems, 10, 12-13, 18, 59, 151, 317: contract, 317 Congo, 287 Conservative estimate/conservatism, 268 Consolidation restriction, 71 Contract analysis, 1, 10-13, 57-75, 104, 107-109, 149-157, 197-198, 206-21 1 , 281-327. SEE ALSO Fiscal svstem analysis, Fiscal svstem design, AND individual contract types. Contract elements, 104 Contract summaries (examples), 281-327: Angola, 282; Azerbaijan, 283; China, 284; Colombia, 285-286; Congo, 287; Cote d’Ivoire, 288; Ecuador, 289-291; Egypt, 292-293; Equatorial Guinea, 294; Guatemala, 295; India, 296-297; Indonesia, 298-303; Iran, 304-305; Libya, 306-307; Malaysia, 308-31 1 ; Nigeria, 312; Oman, 313; Pakistan, 314-315; Peru, 316-318; Philippines, 319; Trinidad and Tobago, 320; Qatar, 321; Russia, 322; Syria, 323; Timor Gap-ZOCA, 324;Turkmenistan, 325; Venezuela, 326; Zambia, 327 Contract terms (Kazakhstan), 206-21 1: Kashagan field, 206-209; R factor , 209-210; internal rate of return, 210;-volume factor, 211 Contract terms, 11, 107-109, 206-211: Kazakhstan, 206-211. SEE ALSO Contract summaries (examples). Contractor entitlement , 172 , 214 Contractor, 2, 11 , 20, 27-29, 32-33, 53-56, 58-60, 72, 99, 151-152, 172 , 214, 227-228: contractor / company take, 20, 27-28, 32- 33, 53-56, 58-60, 72, 99, 151-152, 227-228; entitlement , 172 , 214 379International Exploration Economics. Risk, and Contract Analysis Contractor/company take, 20, 27-28, 32-33, 53-56, 58-60, 72 , 99 151-152, 227-228 Contractual systems, 10-13. SEE ALSO Contract (examples). Conversion factors, 195 Corporate income tax (C1T), 20, 23, 30 Cost control, 88, 137, 141-144, 193-194: international, 88; cheating, 143-144 Cost estimates, 223 Cost factors, 183 Cost recovery' limit, 32, 67, 72, 101, 154, 174 Cost/ recovery (C/ R), 4, 32, 36-37, 59, 67, 72, 101, 141, 154, 174, 212, 311: cost recovery limit, 32, 67, 72, 101, 154, 174; saturated system, 36-37; contract, 31 1 Cote d’Ivoire, 288 Crypto taxes, 58, 72-74, 105 Cultural issues, 89-91, 135: Former Soviet Union, 89-91 Cumulative production sliding scale, 211 Currency conversions (mandatory), 58 Current developments (production sharilgg contracts), 107-113: contract terms, 107-109; prospectivity, 107-109; risk and reward, 109-110; reserve replacement, 110-113; commentary, 113; references, 11 3 summaries D Decision tree analysis, 164 Decline rate, 184 Deductions (R /T systems), 19-20 Definitions, 329-368 Deflated value, 209-210 380Glossary Depreciation rates, 56 Depreciation, depletion and amortization (DD&A), 19-20, 25, 56, 129: depreciation rates, 56 Development costs, 263 Development drilling success ratio, 188 Development options (gas), 121, 128-130 Development rights, 3 Development thresholds, 8-9 Disbursement of take, 196 Discounted cash flow (DCF), 20, 22-23, 34, 225, 229, 256-257 Discoveries, 79, 94-95, 110-113, 115-116, 118-121, 161, 201-202, 269: assumptions, 161; well, 201-202; value, 269 Discovery assumptions, 161 Discovery value, 269 Discovery well, 201-202 Division of profits, 58-66, 87-88, 91, 97-100, 137-138: contractor/company take, 58-60; government take, 58-60, 64-66; terminology, 60-66; marginal take, 64; government vs. state take, 64-66; international, 87-88, 91 Domestic market obligation (DMO), 61, 105 Drilling costs, 94, 179-180 Drilling success ratio, 188 Drive mechanisms, 273-274 Duration/relinquishment, 153 E Earlyj Jyears costs, 182 East Kalimantan , 126 Economic interest, 263 381International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis Economic model assumptions, 177-188: initial oil price, 177-178; capital cost per unit, 179; exploration well costs, 179-180; capital costs per BOPD, 180-181; capital costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; total costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; operating costs (peak year ) / total capital costs, 181 -182; operating costs (early years), 182; operating costs (full cycle), 182-183; technical aspects/assumptions, 183-188; conclusion, 188 Economic model example, 160-175: discussion, 165; veracity of model, 165; government profit oil share, 165-168; most likely 100 MMBL field production profile, 168-175; government take, 169-170; effective royalty rate, 170-172; savings index, 172-173; entitlement index, 173-174; spot checks, 174; cost recovery limit, 174; taxation, 174-175; company cash flow, 175 Economic modeling/auditing, 159-176: economic model example, 160-175; discussion, 165; veracity of model, 165; government profit oil share, 165-168; most likely 100 MMBL field production profile, 168-175; government take, 169-170; effective royalty rate, 170-172; savings index, 172-173; entitlement index, 173-174; spot checks, 174; cost recovery limit, 174; taxation, 174-175; company cash flow, 175; conclusion, fe76 Economic modeling/auditing, 177-188: initial oil price, 177-178; capital cost per unit, 179; exploration well costs, 179-180; capital costs per BOPD, 180-181; capital costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; total costs as percentage of gross revenues, 181; operating costs (peak year )/ total capital costs, 181-182; operating costs (early years), 182; operating costs (full cycle), 182-183; technical aspects/assumptions, 183-188; conclusion, 188. SEE ALSO Economic model assumptions. Economic profits, 138-1 39 Economic rent, 2-5, 1 33 Ecuador, 196, 289-291 Effective royalty rate ( ERR ), 30, 36-40, 55, 66, 74, 100-101 , 140-142, 170-172, 196, 269-271: calculation, 140; cost control, 141-142 Egypt, 155, 195, 292-293 382Glossary Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 260 Entitlement barrels, 251, 266-268 Entitlement index, 74, 102-103, 173-174: calculation, 102-103 Equatorial Guinea, 50, 294 Equity split, 59 Estimating problems, 86 Ethane, 126 Expectations, 220, 222 Expected monetary value (EMV), 7, 109-110: model, 7 Expected ultimate recovery, 272-274 Expected value theory, 2, 7 Expected value formula, 159, 163-164 Expected value (EV), 2, 7, 109-110, 159, 163-164, 225-227, 229-233: theory, 2, 7; model, 7; formula, 159, 163-164 Exploration agreement, 41 Exploration and development production-sharing agreements (EDPSA), 1 Exploration costs, 94, 179-180, 262: well costs, 179-180 Exploration production-sharing agreements (EPSA), 1 Exploration rights, 3, 190-191: and development, 3 Exploration well costs, 179-180 Export tariffs, 89 F Factor R-based systems, 42-44, 154-155, 209-210: R thresholds, 42-43; payout/yield, 43; royalty rate, 43-44 Farm-in strategy, 84-85 FAS 19 , 259-261 FAS 25, 261 FAS 69, 260-263 Fast-track approach, 85 Federal Securities Laws, 260 383International Exploration Economics,Risk, and Contract Analysis Feedstock (gas ), 125-126 Feedstock requirement, 125 Fertilizer, 121, 126 Field development thresholds, 8-9 * Field production profile (example), 168-175: government take, 169-170; effective royalty rate, 170-172; savings index, 173-173; entitlement index, 173-174; spot checks, 174; cost recovery limit, 174; taxation, 174-175; company cash flow, 175 Field size, 110, 121, 129 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 259-260 Financial split, 133 First tranche petroleum, 67 Fiscal marksmanship, 1 52 Fiscal net, 133 Fiscal system analysis, 57-75: division of profit, 58-60, 64-66; terminology, 60-66; royalties, 66; cost recovery limits, 67; access to gross revenues, 67-69, 74; government participation/carrv, 69-70; ringfencing, 70-71; crypto/other taxes, 72; world average fiscal system, 72-73; commentary, 73-74; changes since 1996, 74; references, 75 V Fiscal system design, 149-157: key elements, 150-151; productionsharing systems, 151-152; allocation mechanism, 152; work program, 152-153; duration/relinquishment, 153; bonus, 153-154; royalties, 154; cost recovery limit, 154; profit oil split and tax, 154-155; government participation, 156; commentary, 156-157 Fiscal system development trends, 13-28: progressive systems, 13-18; royalty/ tax (R/T) systems, 18-26; contractor take/government take statistics, 27-28; production sharing contracts (PSC), 28-44 Fiscal systems, 1-75, 83, 87-88, 93, 96, 133, 137, 149-157, 161, 192, 194, 197-198: development trends, 13-28; analysis, 57-75; efficiency, 66; international, 87-88; design, 149-157; evaluation, 197-198 Fiscal take, 133, 192 Fiscal terms, 6, 61 -62, 83, 93, 96, 161 384Glossary Fluctuating entitlement, 267-268 Fluid properties, 273 Formaldehyde, 126 Former Soviet Union (FSU), 50, 86, 89-91, 94, 196: export tariffs, 89; ownership, 89-90; partner chemistry, 90; division of profits, 91; petroleum law/precedence, 91 Forum for concerns, 198 Frondizi contracts, 42 Fuel booking, 265 Fuel cells, 131 Full cost accounting, 260, 262-263 Full cycle costs, 182-183 Future outlook (gas resource), 131 G Gas clause, 130 Gas composition, 127 Gas compressibility, 119 Gas conversion factor, 266 Gas curse, 118-121 Gas cycling, 121, 124 Gas flaring, 115, 130 Gas hydrates, 131 Gas industry, 115-131: gas curse, 118-121; development options, 121 , 128-130; gas sales, 122; liquids extraction , 122-124; gas cycling, 124; gas-fired power generation , 124-125; methanol , 125-129; fertilizer, 126; liquefied natural gas (LNG), 126-128; commentary, 1 30-131; future outlook, 1 31 Gas liquids extraction, 121-124 Gas plant liquids, 267 Gas products, 1 31 Gas sales, 121-122 385International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis Gas to liquids process, 1 31 Gas volumetric estimate, 1 19 Gas/oil ratio (GOR), 179-180 Gaseous fuel, 124-125 Gas-fired power generation, 121, 124-126: power plant, 125-126 Gas-fired power plant, 125-126 Geological and geophysical (G&G) work, 85 Geology, 53-56 Geopotential, 10-11, 53-55, 93-95, 107-109 Getting started (international operations), 84-86: grassroots exploration, 84; farm-in strategy, 84-85; acquisitions, 85; problem areas, 86 Gliding scale, 206 Global market, 53-56 Glossary, 329-368 Gold plating, 14, 50 Goods and services taxes, 105 Government back-in, 64-65 Government entitlement, 172 < Government Government guaranteed grief index share (GGI)of , 96 revenue ^ , 137, 139-140 Government options (negotiations), 5-12 Government participation/carry, 15-16, 58-59, 65, 68-70, 72, 156 Government profit oil share, 165-168 Government take calculation, 139-140, 143-144: government guaranteed share of revenue, 139-140 Government take, 15-18, 26-28, 56, 58-60, 64-66, 98-99, 133, 139-140, 143-144, 151, 169-170, 192, 196, 212-214, 227-228, 237-246: calculation , 139-140, 143-144; disbursement, 196; statistical properties, 237-246; explanation, 241-242; macroeconomic scope, 241-243; relevance, 244-246; references, 246 386Glossary Governments perspective (international), 87-89: type of system (profits/ revenue), 87-88; cost control, 88; authorization for expenditure, 88; maximum efficient rate, 88; companv evaluation , 88-89 Grassroots exploration, 84 Gravity-drainage reservoirs, 146 Greed concept, 189-193: national oil company, 189-190; government take, 192; Indonesia terms, 192-193 Gross benefits , 242-243 Gross revenues, 181 Grossed up, 267 Ground floor deals, 85 Guatemala , 295 Guerilla vaccine, 196 Gulf of Mexico , 87, 145 H Highest bonus bidding, 230-233 History (bidding), 220-222 Horizontal wells, 185-187 Host government contract, 241-242 Host government, 1 -3, 5-12, 87-89, 241-242: contract, 241-242 Hot spots (international), 86-87, 94-95: Argentina, 86; West Africa, 86; United Kingdom, 86-87; Australia, 87; Gulf of Mexico, 87; China , 87 Hydrocarbon potential, 10-11, 53-55, 199-206, 222-224: Kashagan field, 199-202;Tengiz field, 202-206; expectations, 222; prospect size, 223-224 387International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis I Import duties, 58 Imputed entitlement barrels, 266 Incremental production contract (IPC), 286 India , 296-297 Indonesia, 6, 27, 29-30, 59, 61, 67, 73, 107, 116, 127, 142, 145, 192-193, 196, 275, 298-303 Infrastructure (Kazakhstan), 205 Initial oil price, 177-178 Initial production rate/ well, 186 Intangible drilling costs (IDC), 19 Interest alignment (governments/companies), 133-147: boundary conditions, 134; culture, 135; objectives, 135; polio*, 136; strategy/tactics, 136-137; fiscal system example, 137; division of profits, 138; government take calculation, 139-140, 143-144; effective royalty rate calculation, 140-142; effect of savings, 142; marginal government take calculation, 143-144; maximum efficient rate, 144-146; references, 147 Internal rate of return (IRR), 44, 50-51Xl 54-155, 210, 244-245 International gas industry, 115-131: gas curse, 118-121; development options, 121, 128-130; gas sales, 122; liquids extraction, 122-124; gas cycling, 124; gas-fired power generation, 124-125; methanol, 125-129; fertilizer, 126; liquefied natural gas (LNG), 126-128; commentary, 130-131; future outlook, 131 International oil company (IOC), 135, 140, 144 International operations, 77-106: U.S., 77-78; production rates, 78-79; stripper wells, 78; discoveries, 79; production statistics, 80-82; fiscal terms, 83; getting started, 84-86; hot spots worldwide, 86-87; government’s perspective, 87-89; Former Soviet Union , 89-91; commentarv, 92; trends and issues (production sharing contracts), 93-106 International production acquisitions, 85, 256-259 Intranational gas production, 115-116 388Glossary Investment credit , 61 Iran , 180, 194, 198, 244, 304-305 Iraq, 180 Ireland , 83 j Japan, 128 Joint ventures (JV), 52-53 K Kashagan field, 199-202, 206-209: hydrocarbon potential, 199-202; discovery well, 201-202; commercial terms, 206-209 Kazakhstan, 50, 199-218: hydrocarbon potential, 199-206; Kashagan field , 199-202, 206-209; Tengiz field, 202-206; climate, 205; infrastructure, 205; reservoir depth/pressure, 205-206; productive area, 206; commercial terms, 206-211; profit/profitability, 211-214; value, 214-217; references, 217-218 Kuwait, 135, 180, 244 L Lease acquisition costs, 262 Liberia, 50 Libya, 306-307 License contract, 317 License rounds, 112 License trading, 84 389International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis License/licensing, 84, 112, 190-191, 317: trading, 84; rounds, 112; contract, 317 Lifting entitlement, 173-174, 267 Liquefied natural gas (LNG), 126-128: LNG plant, 126-127 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 121-124 Liquids extraction (gas), 122-124 Lowest known hydrocarbons, 265 M Macroeconomics, 241-243 Malaysia, 6, 73, 142, 308-311 Marginal government take calculation, 143-144: cost control and cheating, 143-144 Marginal government take, 142-144: calculation, 143-144; cost control and cheating, 143-144 Marginal take, 64, 133, 142-144: marginal government take, 142-144 Maximum efficient rate (MER), 88, 1^7, 144-146, 271-280: rate sensitivity, 144-146; water-drive r^ervoirs, 145-146; solution gas-drive reservoirs, 146; gravity-drainage reservoirs, 146; expected ultimate recovery, 272-273; drive mechanisms, 273- 274; production to reserves ratio, 274-279; references, 280 Methane, 126 Methanol, 121, 125-129 Mexico, 272-272 Middle East, 42, 244 Mineral interests, 263-264 Most likely recoverable reserves, 268 Most likely reserves, 254 MTBE, 126 Mutuality of interests, 137, 172 Myanmar, 196 390Glossary N National employment quotas, 58 National oil company (NOC), 37, 52, 65, 68-70, 1 36- 1 37, 140, 150, 152, 156, 189-190 Natural gas, 115-131:gas curse, 118-121; development options, 121, 128-130; gas sales, 122; liquids extraction, 122-124; gas cycling, 124; gas-fired power generation, 124-125; methanol, 125-129; fertilizer , 126; liquefied natural gas (LNG), 126-128; commentary, 130-131; future outlook, 131 Negotiations, 5-12, 93: government options, 5-12 Net take on marginal barrel, 64 New reserves value, 248-249 New Zealand , 73 Nigeria, 196, 312 Non-exploration contract, 145 Non-risk service contract, 41-42 North Sea , 177-178, 191, 276-277 Norway, 157 Notional volume , 211 Nuclear power plant, 125 O Objectives (alignment of interests), 135 Offset fields, 188 Oil price, 177-178, 22: estimates, 222 Oil volumetric estimate, 120 Oman, 155, 195, 313 Operating expenditures/costs (OPEX), 19, 25, 42, 93, 181-183, 263: peak year/total capital costs, 181-182; early years, 182; full cycle , 182-183 391International Exploration Economics. Risk, and Contract Analysis Operating service agreement, 244 Options (negotiations), 5-12 Outcome maximum/ minimum , 164 Ownership, 11-12, 56, 89-90 P Pakistan , 314-315 Papua New Guinea, 50, 196 Partners/partnership, 52, 90, 135 Payback, 210 Payout formula, 210 Payout/yield, 43, 51, 210: formula, 210 Peak production/ total reserves, 183-184 Percentage (take), 212-214 Peru, 43, 316-318 Peruvian model, 316 Petrochemicals, 125-126 < Petroleum Accounting and Financial Minagement Journal (PAFMJ), 237-238, 241 Petroleum fiscal system analysis, 57-75: division of profit, 58-60, 64-66; terminology, 60-66; royalties, 66; cost recovery limits, 67; access to gross revenues, 67-69, 74; government participation/carry, 69-70; ringfencing, 70-71; crypto/other taxes, 72; world average fiscal system, 72-73; commentary, 73-74; changes since 1996, 74; references, 75 Petroleum fiscal systems (PFS), 1-75: economic rent, 2-5; negotiations, 5-12; concessionary systems, 13; contractual systems, 13; trends in fiscal system development, 13-2S; production sharing contracts, 28-44; rate of return systems, 45- 51; joint ventures, 52-53; global market, 53-56; commentary, 56; state-of-the-art analysis, 57-75 Petroleum law / precedence (FSU ), 91 392r Glossary Philippines, 12, 73, 155, 195, 319 Phuket 2001 roundtable, 189-198: greed concept, 189-193; government take, 192; Indonesia terms, 192-193; cost control, 193-194; booking reserves, 194-195; taxes in lieu, 195-196; government disbursement of take, 196; fiscal system evaluation, 197-198; forum for concerns, 198 Policy (alignment of interests), 136 Power plants, 124-125: construction cost, 125; plant capacity, 125 Present value theory, 2 Price estimates (oil), 222 Probabilistic reserve estimation, 110, 254-255 Problem areas (international), 86 Producing reserves value, 248, 250 Production acquisitions, 255-259: U.S., 255-259; international, 256-259 Production rate, 78-79, 183-188: peak production, 183-184; decline rate , 184; well spacing, 184-185; initial production, 186; vertical vs. horizontal wells, 185-187; BOPD/foot of pay, 187-188 Production sharing agreements (PSA), 1 Production sharing contracts (PSC), 1, 3, 10-12, 28-44, 68, 72, 93-113, 151-152, 194-195, 197, 266, 282-284, 287-303, 308-310, 312, 315-316, 320-321, 323-325, 327: revenue flow, 31; bonus, 31-32; royalty, 32, 36-40; cost/ recovery, 32; profit oil/gas, 32-33; taxation , 33-35; government take, 35-36; effective royalty rate, 36-40; access to gross revenues, 36-40; risk service contracts, 41; pure service contract, 41-42; R factor-based systems, 42-44; trends and issues, 93-106; current developments, 107-113 Production sharingsystem, 1, 3, 10-12, 28-44, 68^72, 93-113, 151-152, 194-195, 197, 266 Production statistics, 80-82 Production/foot of pay, 187-188 Production-to-reserves (P/ R) ratio, 116, 144-145, 183-184, 274-279 Productive area (Kazakhstan), 206 Productivity index, 187-188 Profit oil split, 1 54- 1 55 393International Exploration Economics. Risk, and Contract Analysis Profit oil/gas (P/ O ), 14- 15, 32-33, 41, 154-155, 165-168, 207-208 , 211, 227-228, 267-271 , 306-307: profit oil split, 154-155; risk/ risk analysis, 227-228 Profit sharing, 4, 12, 15-16 Profit/ profitability, 4, 12, 15-16, 26, 30, 35-36, 39, 50, 58-66, 91 , 97-100, 137-138, 154-155, 192, 211-214, 306-307: profii sharing, 4 government take, 58-60, 64-66; terminology, 60-66; marginal take, 64; government take, 64-66, 212-214; government vs. state take, 64-66; royalties, 66; profits-based mechanism, 154-155; cost recovery, 212; contractor entitlement, 214 Profits-based mechanism, 154-155 Progressive systems, 13-18 Prospect size, 223-224 Prospectivity, 10-11, 53-55, 93-95, 107-109, 138, 223-224: prospect size, 223-224 Proved developed producing (PDP) reserve value, 65 Proved reserves, 65, 174, 254-255, 265: developed producing reserves, 65 Pure service contract (PSC), 41-42 ! 1- 1 2 , 15-16; contractor/company take, 58-60; Q Qatar, 321 R R factor-based systems, 42-44, 154-155, 209-210: R thresholds, 42-43; payout/yield, 43; royalty rate, 43-44 Rape and pillage, 144 Rape, pillage, and burn, 144 394Glossary Rate of return (ROR) systems, 17-18, 45-51, 154-155, 210: example, 45-51 Rate sensitivity (production), 144-146: water-drive reservoirs, 145-146; solution gas-drive reservoirs, 146; gravity-drainage reservoirs, 146 Ratio factor. SEE R factor-based systems. J Reasonable certainty concept, 265 Recoverable gas vs. oil, 118 Recovery of cost (R/C) contract, 311 Recovery of costs, 4, 32, 59, 67, 72, 101, 141, 154, 174, 212, 311: cost recovery limit, 32, 67, 72, 101, 154, 174; contract, 311 Regressive fiscal system, 15-18 Relative economics, 61 Relevance (government take), 244-246 Relinquishment, 153, 192-193 Rent theorv, 2 Rental payments (acreage), 58, 72 Reserve recognition accounting (RRA), 101-102, 259-264: definitions, 263-264 Reserve replacement, 110-113 Reserve value estimates, 268-269 Reserve values, 27, 247-255, 268-269: value in the ground, 247-255; estimates, 268-269 Reserves disclosure criteria, 263 Reserves estimates , 247-269: value in the ground, 247-255; rules of thumb , 255-269 Reserves, 101-102, 110-113, 173-174, 183-184,-194-195, 214-215, 223-224, 247-269: values, 27, 247-255, 268-269; recognition accounting, 101-102, 259-264; replacement, 110-113; estimates, 247-269; disclosure criteria, 263; value estimates, 268-269 Reservoir characteristics, 205-206, 272-273:depth/pressure, 205-206; damage, 272 Reservoir damage, 272 reserve 395International Exploration Economics. Risk, and Contract Analysis Reservoir depth/ pressure, 205-206 Revenue allocation, 4 Revenue division, 4, 207-209 Revenue flow, 4, 18-19, 25, 31, 36-40, 43, 56: R/T systems, 18-19, 31 Revenue protection (RP), 96, 100-101 Reward evaluation, 109- 1 10 Reward side, 154, 164 Right to extract, 263 Right to take in kind, 263 Ringfencing, 56, 58, 70-71, 192-193 Risk capital/ dollars, 6-7 Risk model, 161 Risk service contracts (RSC), 12, 41, 319, 326 Risk/ risk analysis, 6-8, 12, 41, 109-110, 161, 198, 224-233, 263, 319, 326: risk capital, 6-7; risk service contracts, 12, 41, 319, 326; risk model, 161; expected value, 225-227, 229-233; profit oil , 227-228 Risk-weighted value, 109-110 Roundtable discussion (Phuket 2001), 189-198: greed concept, cost 189-193 control ; government , 193-194; booking take, 19reserves ^; Indonesia , 194-195 terms ; taxes , 192 in-193 lieu;, 195-196; government disbursement of take, 196; fiscal system evaluation, 197-198; forum for concerns, 198 Royalties, 3, 10, 12-16, 18-26, 30, 32-33, 36-40, 43-44, 56, 58-59, 66-68, 72-73, 151, 154, 195, 197, 266: R/T systems, 10, 12-13, 18-26, 32, 36-40, 72, 151, 197; sliding scale, 14-15; rate, 43-44; rovalty oil, 266 Royaltv oil, 266 Royalty rate, 43-44 Royalty/ tax (R /T) systems, 10, 12-13, 18-26, 32, 36-40, 72 , 151, 197, 314, 318: revenue flow, 18-19; royalties, 19, 32, 36-40; deductions, 19-20; taxation, 20-26; effective royaltv rate, 36-40 Rule 4-10(a) of Regulation S-X, 260 Rule 4-10(b) of Regulation S-X, 263-264 396Glossary Rules of thumb, 255-269: U.S. production acquisitions, 255-259; international production acquisitions, 256-259; booking barrels, 259-260, 265, 268-269; reserve recognition accounting, 259-263; reserves disclosure, 263; reserves recognition definitions, 263-264; booking fuel, 265-266; booking barrels of oil equivalent, 266; booking royalty oil, 266; booking gas plant liquids, 267; booking barrels under service agreements, 267; fluctuating entitlement, 267-268; reserve value estimates, 268-269 Russia, 52-53, 55, 89-91, 322 s Sample contracts (summaries), 281-327: Angola, 282; Azerbaijan, 283; China, 284; Colombia, 285-286; Congo, 287; Cote d’Ivoire, 288; Ecuador, 289-291; Egypt, 292-293; Equatorial Guinea, 294; Guatemala , 295; India, 296-297; Indonesia, 298-303; Iran, 304-305; Libya, 306-307; Malaysia, 308-311; Nigeria, 312; Oman, 313; Pakistan, 314-315; Peru, 316-318; Philippines, 319; Trinidad and Tobago, 320; Qatar, 321; Russia, 322; Syria, 323; Timor Gap-ZOCA, 324;Turkmenistan, 325;Venezuela, 326; Zambia, 327 Saturated system, 36-37, 140, 170, 271: cost recovery, 36-37 Saudi Arabia, 180, 197-198, 244-245 Savings effect, 142 Savings index, 74, 144, 172-173 Scheduling (operations), 153 Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 254, 259-26i Sensitivity analysis, 44 Service agreement, 41 Service company, 190 Service contracts, 12 Service fee, 33 Sharecropper concept, 12 397International Exploration Economics. Risk, and Contract Analysis Signature bonus bidding, 225-227 Signature bonus, 153-154, 225-227: bidding, 225-227 Sliding scale royalty, 14-15 Sliding scales, 14-15, 155, 206, 211: royalty, 14-15 Solution gas-drive reservoirs, 146 Spot checks, 174 State take. SEE Government take. State/government, 1 -3, 5-12, 133, 192 Statistical properties, 237-246 Straight line decline (SLC), 20, 23 Stranded natural gas, 116, 120 Strategy/ tactics (alignment of interests), 1 36-137 Stripper wells, 78, 94 Success ratio, 188, 224-233: drilling, 188; competitive bidding examples, 225-233 Successful efforts accounting, 260, 263-264 Sumatra , 116 Supplementary petroleum tax (SPT), 20, 22-23, 26 Synthesis gas, 125 Syria, 155, 195, 323 T Take statistics, 97, 106, 192-193, 237-246: strengths/weaknesses, 97; government take, 237-246; statistical properties, 237-246; explanation, 241-242; macroeconomic scope, 242-243; relevance, 244-246; references, 246 TAME , 126 Tanzania, 50 Tax base spectrum, 16 Tax loss carry forward (TLCF), 20, 22-23, 25, 34, 257 Tax rate, 59 Tax take, 1 33, 192 398Glossary Taxable income, 20 Taxation , 2-3, 15-16, 20-26, 33-35, 40, 46, 53, 58-59, 105, 133, 154-155, 157, 174-175, 192, 195-196, 242-243, 257, 266: theory, 2; tax base spectrum, 16; income, 20; loss, 20, 22-23, 25, 34 , 257; R /T systems, 20-26, 33-35; rate, 59; tax take, 1 33, 192; taxes in lieu, 266 Taxes in lieu (fuel), 266 Technical aspects/assumptions (economic model/auditing), 183-188: peak production/total reserves, 183-184; decline rate, 184; well spacing, 184-185; initial production rate/well, 186; vertical vs. horizontal wells, 185-187; BOPD/foot of pay, 187-188; development drilling success ratio, 188 Tengiz field, 202-206: hydrocarbon potential, 202-206; climate, 205; infrastructure, 205; reservoir depth/ pressure, 205-206; productive area, 206 Terminology, 58-60, 98-100, 198, 238-239, 329-368: division of profits, 98-100 Terms bidding, 227-230: combination with bonus, 229-230 Thailand , 198 Third-for-a-cjuarter promote, 85 Threshold, 50 Timing, 116-117, 223: oil vs. gas development, 116-117; estimate, 223 Timor Gap, 73, 324: ZOCA, 324 Total costs (percentage of gross revenues), 181 Training obligations, 58, 72 Trends and issues (foreign PSC), 93-106: geopotential, 93-95; operating costs, 93; negotiations, 93; fiscal terms, 93, 96; take statistics (strengths/weaknesses), 97; division of profits (example), 97-100; government take (Venezuela), 98; terminology*, 98-100; government take, 99; contractor/company take, 99; bonus, 100; effective royalty rate, 100-101; revenue protection, 100-101; access to gross revenues, 100-102; cost recovery limit, 101; entitlement index calculation , 102-103; key contract elements, 104; crypto taxes, 105; commentary, 106 399International Exploration Econo^ cs, Risk, and Contract Analysis Trigger tax , 46 Trinidad and Tobago, 152, 155, 191 , 193, 195, 320 Tunisia, 43 Turkmenistan, 325 Turnover, 43 Tvpe of system (international ), 87-8S U United Kingdom, 6, 86-87, 156-157, 242-243 United States , 54-55, 77-78, 94, 255-259: production acquisitions, 255-259 Urea , 126 V Value (commercial terms), 214-217 fcj Value of reserves, 247-255: in the ground, 247-255; new reserves, 248-249; producing reserves, 248, 250 Value-added taxes, 58, 105 Venezuela, 72, 83, 98, 196, 326 Veracity (economic model), 165 Vertical vs. horizontal wells, 1 S5-187 Volume factor, 208, 21 1 Volumetric comparison (gas vs. oil), 1 18 400 -r Glossary W Water-drive reservoirs, 145-146 Well spacing, 184-187, 265, 277-279: vertical vs. horizontal wells, 185-187 Well test rates, 94-95 Well testing, 94-95, 201-202: rates, 94-95 West Africa, 86 Winners curse, 100, 231, 257 Work commitment, 6, 110 Work program, 100, 135, 152-153 Working interest, 65, 194 World average fiscal system, 72-73 World Bank model, 210 X-Z Z values, 119 Zambia , 327 Zero tax base concept
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