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 |  موضوع: كتاب Mechanical Choices - The Responsibility of the Human Machine السبت 02 أبريل 2022, 6:10 pm | |
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أخواني في الله
أحضرت لكم كتاب
Mechanical Choices - The Responsibility of the Human Machine
MICHAEL S. MOORE
University of Illinois
و المحتوى كما يلي :
Index
Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number
For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear
on only one of those pages.
Accomplice liability, 46–48, 46t
Action
bodily movements
actions as brain-caused bodily
movements, 451–58
as essential to action, 63–68
as means of change, 74–75
as object that intention is causing, 70–75
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
relation of intention to, 68–70
causal theory of action (CTA) (See Causal
theory of action [CTA])
general part of criminal law and, 39–40
human agency compared, 39–40
overview, 13, 57
special part of criminal law and, 28–29
“Actish” phenomenal feel, 76, 77–78, 79–80,
81–82, 83, 85
Actus reus. See Action
Addiction
“addiction gene” and, 546n.149
automaticity models
cravings as emotion-driven bypassing of
intention, 502
frozen beliefs and, 504–5
halfway to intention models, 503
overview, 500
preconscious actions, 500–1
too many versus too few intentions, 501
brain dysfunction and, 535–36
conceptualization of, 479–90
“dark side of addiction” theory, 554–57, 565
“demon drug” story, 538–44,
538–39n.124, 547
disability and, 557–58
disease model of addiction, 483–89, 535
dopamine and, 539–41, 542, 543, 544–46,
544n.144, 545nn.145–146, 545n.148, 547
“ego-alien” desires and, 566–67
executive control functions and, 561–62
failures of actions to match intentions, 507–8
failures of experiential satisfaction to match
desires and choices, 508–9
failures of intentions to match desires
or values
cognitive failure, 504
motivational failure, 504–5
normative failure, 506
overview, 504
folk psychology explanations of
combination of, 509–10
conclusions regarding, 570–71
less than full practical rationality, 499–509
neuroscience, potential of for
changing, 534–36
overview, 490
practical rationality schema, 490–97
rational choice model, 497–99
Helping to End Addiction Long-Term
(HEAL) Initiative, 477
“hijacking” and, 541–44
imbalance explanation, 550–51, 564
impairment and, 557–58
incentive salience theory, 547–54,
556–57, 564–65
incompatibilism and, 487–89
“learning or habit” theories, 548–49, 566
less than full practical rationality, 499–509
medical definition of, 482–83, 489–90
as moral excuse and legal defense
acting against own intentions, 530–33
addicts most desiring or valuing what they
do not like, 533–34
akratic addicts, 530–33
“automatic pilot,” addicts acting
on, 519–23
capacity not to have cravings and, 511–12574 Index
choices not matching desires or
values, 523–30
cognitive failures and, 523–25
conclusions regarding, 571
dual intentions automaticity, 522–23
emotion-caused automaticity, 520–22
fully rational addict, 518–19
habits and, 519–20
as legal defense, 322–23, 478–79,
478nn.3–4, 478–79n.7
motivational failures and, 525–28
neuroscience, potential of for changing or
justifying doctrine of, 534–36
normative failures and, 528–30
overview, 322–23, 510–11, 517–18
preconscious actions and, 519–20
questions regarding, 510–11
rejected arguments, 511–17
responsibility for addition in first place
and, 514–17
withdrawal and, 512–14
wrongdoing, confusion with, 568–69
neuroscience and
conclusions regarding, 571–72
continued drug use by addicts, explanation
of, 547–62
excuse, inferences regarding, 570
expansion of moral excuse and legal
defense based on, 562–68
explanation of addiction, 536–62
folk psychology explanations, potential for
changing, 534–36
moral excuse and legal defense, potential
for changing or justifying doctrines
of, 534–36
nonaddicted drug use that risks or causes
addiction, explanation of, 537–47
opioid addiction, 480–81
overview, 16, 477–79, 568–72
Powell v. Texas, 517–18n.80
practical rationality schema, 490–97
immediate etiology of rational action,
491–93f, 493–95
prehistory of actions in terms of long-term
causes, 490–91, 490–91f
rational choice model, 497–99
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 519n.84
retributive justice and, 569
Robinson v. California, 485–86
statistics regarding, 477–78
substance use disorders, 480–81
“subsystems in conflict” explanation,
550n.159
willpower and, 561–62, 561n.190
“Addiction gene,” 546n.149
Agency
human agency (See Human agency)
moral agency (See Moral agency)
secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267
Akratic addicts, 530–33
Alces, Peter, 2–3
Aleska, Valentina, 363–64
Alexander, Bruce, 538–39n.124
Alexander, Franz, 274–75
American Law Institute, 161, 162–64, 395n.31
American Medical Association, 326–27n.38
American Psychiatric Association, 151, 152,
153, 154–55, 326–27n.38, 477–78,
480, 484
An American Tragedy (Dreiser), 502
Analytical hard determinism, 244
Analytical reductionism, 212–13
Andreasen, Nancy, 535–36
Animals, analogy to in insanity defense, 185–86
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 365–67, 557,
560–61, 563
Anteroventral prefrontal cortex, 365–67
Aquinas, Thomas, 121–22, 129, 268–69
Aretaic morality, 65–66n.38
Aristotle, 53, 159, 175–77, 182, 290–91, 314–15,
317, 523–24, 527
Armstrong, David, 61, 68–69, 443–44
Arnold, Edward, 185–86
Ascriptive morality, 19–20, 57, 208, 380
Aspaas, Agnar, 192, 193–94
“Astonishing hypothesis,” 437–38. See also
Reductionism
Austin, J.L., 52–53, 284, 290–91, 293–94, 298–99,
341, 349, 416
Automaticity models of addiction
cravings as emotion-driven bypassing of
intention, 502
frozen beliefs and, 504–5
halfway to intention models, 503
overview, 500
preconscious actions, 500–1
too many versus too few intentions, 501
Ayer, A.J., 284, 309–10
Bargh, John, 221, 223, 500–1, 502
Battery-assault interchange, 111
Baumeister, Roy, 561n.190
Bechtel, Bill, 448
Addiction (Cont.)Index 575
Becker, Gary, 498
Belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation, 72,
98–103, 99–103f
Belief versus intention
as to circumstances, 128–41
commitment criterion, 130–33
intention-based commitments, 129–40
intention criterion, 133–141
motivation and, 129–30, 132
overview, 95
salience and, 137–39
legal belief versus factual belief, 112
Model Penal Code and, 117–18, 129, 140
overview, 13, 117–18
as to result, 118–27
change in meaning of intention and, 122
closeness doctrine and, 122–27
“common sense” possibility, 126–27
content of intention and, 122–27
Duff ’s hypothetical, 119
Herod/John the Baptist hypothetical, 118,
119, 120–23
optimistic version, 120–22
overview, 95
skeptical version, 120–22
special part of criminal law and, 28–29
specific intent versus general intent,
117, 119–20
United States v. Fountain, 128–29
Bennett, Jonathan, 126–27
Bentham, Jeremy, 3, 109, 122, 128n.43
Berker, Selim, 449
Berridge, Kent, 503, 508–9, 523, 526–27, 533,
551, 557, 564–65
Bickel, Warren, 550–51
Bittner, T., 401
Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne, 240
Blameworthiness
culpability and, 92
epiphenomenalism, moral and legal
relevance of claims of
overview, 391–92
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
will as merely epiphenomenal and not
causal of bodily movements, 392–94
insanity defense and, 167, 168
intention and, 89
psychology and, 4–5
responsibility and, 90–91
skepticism of neuroscience toward, 3–5, 7–9
Bleuler, Manfred, 184
Bodily movements
actions as brain-caused bodily
movements, 451–58
as essential to action, 63–68
as means of change, 74–75
as object that intention is causing, 70–75
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
relation of intention to, 68–70
Bonnie, Richard, 326–27n.38
Boyle’s Law, 441–42
de Bracton, Henry, 185–86
Bradley, F.H., 52
Brainwashing, 527n.93
Bratman, Michael, 62, 380–81, 495–96
Breivik, Andres, 143–44, 156, 177, 189, 192,
193–97, 199, 202–3
Brentano, Franz, 181
Brooks, David, 9–10, 11
Butler, Samuel, 167–68, 484–85, 486
Cacioppo, John, 567–68n.196
California Privacy Act, 109
Calvinism, 228, 265
Canada, addiction as defense in, 478n.3
Cane, Peter, 32–33, 34, 37, 41
Cardozo, Benjamin, 96–97n.37
Cashmore, Tony, 7
Causal laws, 413
Causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72
Causal theory of action (CTA)
bodily movements
actions as brain-caused bodily
movements, 451–58
as essential to action, 63–68
as means of change, 74–75
as object that intention is causing, 70–75
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
relation of intention to, 68–70576 Index
causal relevance and, 68, 69–70
displacement refraining and, 64
mental actions and, 65–66
mind-brain interface machines and, 63–64
normative implications of, 58
omission and, 66–68
overview, 57–59
rejection by “New Mysterians,” 59–62
resisting and, 64
willed but indirectly caused bodily changes
and, 64
willed stillness and, 63
Causation
belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation, 72,
98–103, 99–103f
deviant causal chains, 71, 72, 76–85, 103, 381
insanity defense and, 169–74
freedom of mentally ill offenders, 170–71
ideology, 172–73
ignorance regarding mental illness, 172
selective determinism, 172–73
strength of mental illness as cause, 170
sufficiency of mental illness as
cause, 171–72
liability and, 37–38, 43
Centre for the Study of the Human Mind (Oslo
University), 143–44
Chalmers, David, 440–41n.10
Chamlin, Mitchell, 363–64
Charles’s Law, 441–42
“Cheap compatibilism,” 208–10, 248–61, 274
Children
immaturity as defense, 322–23, 344
insanity defense, analogy to in, 185, 186
Chisholm, Robert, 289–90, 298–300, 416
Choudhury, Suparna, 240
Churchland, Patricia, 464n.60
Churchland, Paul, 464n.60
Classical compatibilism
with amendments to avoid objections, 311
conditionalizing “could,” 287–92
from “could have. . .if. . .” to “would
have. . .if. . . ,” 292–96
counterfactuals, 296–98
new conditionalist compatibilism
versus, 304–7
overview, 286–87
Classically reductionist physicalism, 441–43
Cleese, John, 225–26
Clemenceau, Georges, 209
Closeness doctrine, 122–27
Cochran, John, 363–64
Cognitive excuse, volitional excuse
distinguished, 315, 317
Cohen, Jonathan, 2, 7–8, 9, 216–17, 226, 228–29,
248, 438, 458–59, 460
Coke, Edward (Lord), 185–86
Compatibilism
“cheap compatibilism,” 208–10, 248–61, 274
classical compatibilism
with amendments to avoid objections, 311
conditionalizing “could,” 287–92
from “could have...if...” to “would have...
if...,” 292–96
counterfactuals, 296–98
new conditionalist compatibilism
versus, 304–7
overview, 286–87
duress and, 285
incompatibilism versus, 282–83
libertarian responses versus, 268
limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism
with responsibility
ability to generally control past
and, 426–28
control of strongly necessary and
immediate past and, 429–34
denial of control of past and, 428–29
Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432
noncausal control of epiphenomenal
forks, 420–25
overview, 15, 413–17
paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25,
428–29, 432
responses to claims of non-cause-based
control, 425–34
logical positivism compatibilism, 283–86
new conditionalist compatibilism
apparent ability to do otherwise, 298–99
aversions, 300–1
classical compatibilism versus, 304–7
compulsive desires, 303
constitutive luck in having desires,
299–300
crazy desires and beliefs, 303–4
“finkish” dispositions, 299
“finkish” variations of obsessive desire/
aversion counterexamples, 301–3
infinite regress of choosing to choose
to, 299
overview, 298
“sticky” versus “nonsticky” choices, 299
“unlucky” failures, 298
“overshoot” problem (See Volitional excuse)
overview, 14, 268, 310
Causal theory of action (CTA) (Cont.)Index 577
source compatibilism, 307–10
supposed irrelevance of freedom to do or will
otherwise, 307–10
volitional excuse and (See Volitional excuse)
Complicity liability, 46–48, 46t
Componential mechanism, 448–49
Conational excuse, volitional excuse
distinguished, 317–22
Conditional intentions, 110
Consciousness, intention and, 104–5
Consent as defense, 40
Conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t
Contract law
criminal law compared, 51, 51n.104
intention in, 69–70n.59, 88–89
moral desert and, 210–11
Contributory negligence, 36
Craver, Carl, 448
Crick, Francis, 225, 437–38, 442,
449–50, 468–69
Criminal law
blameworthiness (See Blameworthiness)
contract law compared, 51, 51n.104
culpability (See Culpability)
defenses (See Defenses)
descriptive theories of law and (See
Descriptive theories of law)
dualism in, 467–68
general part (See General part of
criminal law)
insanity defense (See Insanity defense)
liability (See Liability)
Model Penal Code (See Model Penal Code)
omission, crimes of, 39
overview, 12, 19–20
punishment (See Punishment)
responsibility (See Responsibility)
retributive justice (See Retributive justice)
special part (See Special part of
criminal law)
strict liability offenses, 38–39
tort law compared, 51
wrongdoing (See Wrongdoing)
Culpability
belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation and,
98–103, 99–103f
blameworthiness and, 92
circumstance elements of crimes and,
101–3, 101–3f
intention and, 87–88, 89–92, 103
liability and, 44
result elements of crimes and, 98–101, 99–101f
usages of, 91–92
volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t
Damasio, Tony, 367, 460
Danto, Arthur, 248–49, 430–31
“Dark side of addiction” theory, 554–57, 565
Davidson, Donald, 62, 64–65, 290, 290n.63,
291, 330, 331, 333, 505n.58, 506
Dawkins, Richard, 225–26
Deecke, L., 218, 417–19
Defenses
addiction, 322–23, 478–79, 478nn.3–4,
478–79n.7 (See also Addiction)
consent, 40
diminished capacity, 322–23
diminished responsibility, 322–23
duress, 40, 285, 316, 322–23, 344
immaturity, 322–23, 344
insanity (See Insanity defense)
intoxication, 322–23, 344
necessity, 316, 322–23
provocation, 40–41, 322–23
self-defense, 322–23
volitional excuse, legal defenses
involving, 322–23
wrongdoing, confusion with, 568–69
Delaney, Neil, 127
Deliberate and premeditated
intentionality, 96–97
Dement, William C., 399–400
“Demon drug” story, 538–44, 538–39n.124, 547
Dennett, Daniel, 3, 227, 240, 248–61, 279–80,
309, 464n.60, 472–73, 527n.93
Denno, Deborah, 2–3
Deontic ethics, 31–35
Descartes, René, 61
Descriptive theories of law
authority of law and, 25–26
characteristics of, 25–26
deductive structure, 25
equality and, 26
general part of criminal law as descriptive
theory of special part, 27–35
characteristics of, 36
“content-neutral” terms in special
part, 27–30
criteria for, 35–41
moral aspect of, 31–35
overview, 23–24
possibility of, 35–41
greater determinateness and, 25–26
knowability of law and, 26
overview, 24–26
values in, 26578 Index
Determinism
analytical hard determinism, 244
challenges from neuroscience, 11, 228–33
compatibilist responses to (See
Compatibilism)
epiphenomenalism versus, 413–17
fictionalist responses to
“cheap compatibilism” and, 274
fictional posits of each autonomous
discipline, 274–76
linguistic fictionalism, 276–78
overview, 14–15, 274
pragmatic fictionalism, 279–80
responsibility and, 280–81
social practice/psychological attitude
fictionalism, 278–79
transcendental fictionalism, 276
incapacity to act otherwise, argument from,
266, 267
lack of ultimate self-determination, argument
from, 266
libertarian responses to
causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72
compatibilist responses versus, 268
epistemic libertarianism, 272
metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69
occasional libertarianism, 270
overview, 14–15
patchy libertarianism, 270–71
selective libertarianism, 272–73
manipulation by secondary agents, argument
from, 267
nonanalytical hard determinism, 244
reductionism and, 438–39
volitional excuse and (See Volitional
excuse)
Deviant causal chains, 71, 72, 76–85, 103, 381
Diachronic weakness of will, 342–43, 348, 353,
507–8, 507n.64
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 1st edition
(DSM-I), 151, 155–56
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3rd edition
(DSM-III), 152, 153, 154–55, 484
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th edition
(DSM-IV), 156, 191, 192
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th edition
(DSM-V), 151, 155–56, 480, 482–83
Diamond, Bernard, 5–6
Diminished capacity as defense, 322–23
Diminished responsibility as defense, 322–23
Disease model of addiction, 483–89, 535
District of Columbia Circuit Court
Durham test in, 162–63, 162–63n.64
medical model of legal insanity in, 145–46,
174–75, 197–98
Doctrine of Double Effect, 88
Dolores Claiborne (film), 479–80n.9
Dopamine, 539–41, 542, 543, 544–46, 544n.144,
545nn.145–146, 545n.148, 547
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
addiction and, 557, 560–61, 563
compatibilism and, 297
volitional excuse and, 365–67, 368, 369–71
Double jeopardy, 123
Douglas, William, 486
Dreaming, 399–400
Dreiser, Theodore, 502
Drummond, Edward, 160
Dualism, 440–41, 440–41n.10, 461–63, 466–68
Duff, Anthony, 20–21n.8, 40–41, 53, 65, 66, 119,
318–19, 320–21n.21
Duress as defense, 40, 285, 316, 322–23, 344
Durham experiment, 145–46
Eagleman, David, 2, 3–4, 7–9, 10, 11
Eccles, John, 62, 462–63
“Ego-alien” desires, 332–33, 337–40, 566–67
Electroencephalograms (EEG), 218, 382,
399–400, 417–18
Eliminative materialism, 244, 445–48, 464
Elmer, Martin, 220
Epiphenomenalism
determinism versus, 413–17
Libet experiments, challenges from
causally efficacious will, negation
of, 386–89
free will, negation by unwilled brain
events, 384–86
overview, 383–84
phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390
privileged access, lack of, 389–90
questions regarding, 391
limited compatibilism with responsibility
ability to generally control past
and, 426–28
control of strongly necessary and
immediate past and, 429–34
denial of control of past and, 428–29
Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432
noncausal control of epiphenomenal
forks, 420–25
overview, 15, 413–17
paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25,
428–29, 432
responses to claims of non-cause-based
control, 425–34Index 579
moral and legal relevance of claims
overview, 391–92
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
will as merely epiphenomenal and not
causal of bodily movements, 392–94
neuroscience, challenges from
overview, 11, 15, 417–20
phenomenal awareness, 237–38f, 244
purely epiphenomenal consciousness,
233f, 235f, 237–39, 244
purely epiphenomenal will, 233–36,
236f, 244
overview, 411
reductionism and, 438–39
truth of epiphenomenal claims
nonobservational knowledge, alleged
epiphenomenal status of, 405–10
overview, 398
phenomenal awareness, alleged
epiphenomenal status of, 410
will, alleged epiphenomenal status of,
398–405
Epistemic libertarianism, 272
Executive control functions, 365, 561–62
Experimental psychology, volitional excuse
and, 361–64, 373
Falk, Jerry, 568n.197
Fallibilism
denial of more than occasional
correctness, 245
denial of privileged access, 245
denial of transparency and incorrigibility, 245
overview, 11, 16
reductionism and, 438–39
Farah, Martha, 7
Feinberg, Joel, 197, 414–15
Felony/murder rule, 111
Fictionalist responses to determinism
“cheap compatibilism” and, 274
fictional posits of each autonomous
discipline, 274–76
linguistic fictionalism, 276–78
overview, 14–15, 274
pragmatic fictionalism, 279–80
responsibility and, 280–81
social practice/psychological attitude
fictionalism, 278–79
transcendental fictionalism, 276
Fine, Kit, 68–69, 449
Fingarette, Herbert, 197, 338, 490
Fischer, John Martin, 309–10
Fleming, Stephen, 10–11
Fletcher, George, 27, 37, 53, 467–68n.73
Fodor, Jerry, 183–84n.127
Folk psychology
action and, 57, 69–70
addiction, explanations of
combination of, 509–10
conclusions regarding, 570–71
less than full practical rationality, 499–509
neuroscience, potential of for
changing, 534–36
overview, 490
practical rationality schema, 490–97
rational choice model, 497–99
belief versus intention and, 117–18, 119,
120–21, 128, 141
criminal law and, 19–20
determinism (See Determinism)
epiphenomenalism (See Epiphenomenalism)
fallibilism (See Fallibilism)
intention and, 87, 98–99, 101
Libet experiments, challenges from
causally efficacious will, negation
of, 386–89
free will, negation by unwilled brain
events, 384–86
overview, 383–84
phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390
privileged access, lack of, 389–90
questions regarding, 391
moral agency and, 180
neuroscience and, 211–12, 217, 234, 236, 239
overview, 4–5, 12–13, 14
reductionism (See Reductionism)
volitional excuse and (See Volitional excuse)
Foot, Philippa, 109, 126
Foreseeable second crime doctrine, 48
Fox, Dov, 467, 468
Frankfurt, Harry, 295, 308, 308n.99, 309–10,
337–38, 360, 415–16, 506, 529
Free will
negation by unwilled brain events, 384–86
volitional excuse and, 350–53
Freud, Sigmund, 4–6, 15, 16, 143, 179, 221,
223, 238, 242–43, 338–39, 385–86,
394–95, 395nn.33–34, 397, 402,
408n.60, 411, 417, 438, 496–97, 529–30,
542–43, 566–67
Frontopolar cortex, 215, 220, 242580 Index
Fumerton, Richard, 464n.60
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), 557, 566
Gage, Phineas, 364–68, 370–71, 459–60,
460n.49
Gardner, John, 22
Gazzaniga, Mike, 216, 280–81
General intent versus specific intent, 94–95,
117, 119–20
General part of criminal law
action and, 39–40
Anglo-American theories of, 20–22
complicity liability for procuring or aiding,
46–48, 46t
consent as defense and, 40
conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t
content of, 41–50
as descriptive theory of special part, 27–35
characteristics of, 36
“content-neutral” terms in special
part, 27–30
criteria for, 35–41
moral aspect of, 31–35
overview, 23–24
possibility of, 35–41
duress as defense and, 40
inchoate liability for trying or risking,
44–46, 44t
intention and, 38–39
liability as principle for completed crime, 40t,
41–44, 41t
Model Penal Code and, 38–39, 40–41,
41n.83, 46, 48
provocation as defense and, 40–41
specialness of, 50–53
special part versus, 21, 22–23
as theory of special part, 23–24
variety of theories of, 22–24
George III (UK), 144
Gide, Andre, 533
Glazebrook, Peter, 51n.104
Glueck, Sheldon, 170–71
Goldman, Alvin, 71–72
Goldstein, Abraham, 161, 201n.182
Gomes, Gilberto, 401, 403–4, 407, 409
Goodman, Nelson, 357–58
Grasmick, Harold, 362–64
Green, Stuart, 20–21n.8, 40–41
Greene, Josh, 2, 7–8, 9, 216–17, 226, 228–29,
248, 438, 458–59, 460
Grice, Paul, 62, 469–70, 471
Grievous bodily harm common law murder
doctrine, 111
“Grounding,” 449–50
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 151
Haggard, Patrick, 215–16n.38, 220, 231, 383–84
Hale, Matthew (Lord), 185
Hall, Jerome, 20–22, 37, 53, 275
Hannay, Alastair, 197
Harlow, John Martyn, 364–65n.111, 459–60
Hart, H.L.A., 19–20, 30, 126, 317, 569
Haynes, John-Dylan, 220–21, 242–43, 405,
418–19, 423, 432, 460
Hearst, Parry, 524, 527n.93
Heath, Robert G., 542n.137, 546n.151
Helping to End Addiction Long-Term (HEAL)
Initiative, 477
Hempel, Carl Gustav, 441–42
“Hijacking,” addiction and, 541–44
Hill, Tom, 342n.76
Hills, Alison, 125–26n.31
Hinckley, John, 144
Hirstein, William, 164n.66
Hobbes, Thomas, 265, 385–86
Hollander, Paul, 173, 272–73
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 87–88, 209–10
Holton, Richard, 503, 508–9, 523, 526–27,
533, 564–66
Homer, 547
Honoré, Tony, 358
Hornsby, Jennifer, 420, 421
Human agency
action compared, 39–40
“fishiness” regarding, 7–9
intention and, 88
omission and, 67–68n.47
psychology and, 4–5
skepticism of neuroscience toward, 3–5, 7–9
Hume, David, 227–28, 243, 286, 309–10,
325–26, 416, 420, 427–28, 470, 487,
498–99, 549
Hurd, Heidi, 88–89, 473–74n.82
Husak, Douglas, 29, 39, 53, 528–29
Husby, Torgeir, 192, 193–94
Huxley, Aldous, 497–98
Immaturity as defense, 323, 344
Incentive salience theory, 547–54,
556–57, 564–65
Inchoate liability, 44–46, 44t
Incompatibilism, 282–83
Insanity defense
animals, analogy to, 185–86
blameworthiness and, 167, 168
causation and, 169–74
freedom of mentally ill offenders, 170–71Index 581
ideology, 172–73
ignorance regarding mental illness, 172
selective determinism, 172–73
strength of mental illness as cause, 170
sufficiency of mental illness as
cause, 171–72
children, analogy to, 185, 186
deific decree exception, 187–88
Dew v. Clark, 175
Durham test, 145–46, 162–63,
162–63n.64, 189
elements approach, 163
Hadfield’s Case, 175
Hinckley test, 162
irresistible impulse test, 161, 162–64
knowledge of right and wrong, 160–61,
162–64, 186–87
legal purposes in defining “insanity,” 147–49
morally innocent offenders, insulation
of, 148
nondangerous and nondeterrable
offenders, insulation of, 148
madness
mental disorder, relation to, 191–97
moral agency and, 178–84 (See also Moral
agency)
per se eliminating or reducing
responsibility, 178–91
psychosis, relation to, 191–97
medical model of legal insanity,
144–47, 174–75
mixed theory of punishment and, 148
M’Naghten test, 144, 158, 160–61,
162–64, 186–88
Model Penal Code test, 161–64
moral agency and, 178–84
in Norway (See Norway, insanity law in)
overview, 13, 143–44
psychiatric purposes in defining
terms, 149–58
hard cases purpose, 153
jurisdictional purpose, 153
legitimization purpose, 153, 157–58
“mental disorder,” 152–55
organismic dysfunction, 154
“psychosis,” 155–58
“schizophrenia,” 150–52
strategic purpose, 153
recommendations, 202–3
senses of practical rationality, 204
as status excuse, 188–89
strong relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 166–78
mental disorder, 167–74
particular mental diseases, 166
psychosis, 174–78
utilitarianism and, 149
volitional excuse and, 322–23
weak relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 158–66
Intention
ambiguity regarding circumstances
and, 94, 95
battery-assault interchange and, 111
belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation and,
98–103, 99–103f
belief versus (See Belief versus intention)
blameworthiness and, 89
bodily movement as object that intention is
causing, 70–75
circumstance elements of crimes and,
101–3, 101–3f
conditional intentions, 110
consciousness and, 104–5
in contract law, 69–70n.59, 88–89
culpability and, 87–88, 89–92, 103
deliberate and premeditated
intentionality, 96–97
exercise of normative powers and, 88–89
experience and, 72–74
felony/murder rule and, 111
folk psychology and, 98–99, 101
foreseen consequences and, 94, 95
free nature of, 103–4
general part of criminal law and, 38–39
grievous bodily harm common law murder
doctrine and, 111
human agency and, 88
intentionality, 108, 108n.63, 111–12, 130
intention-tokens, 105–6, 105–6n.60
involuntary intention, 97
knowledge versus, 130
legal concepts of, 93–98
“legal wrong” doctrine and, 111
malice aforethought, 97
“match” questions, 105–14
maxims of, 109–12
mayhem substitution rule and, 111
Model Penal Code and, 94, 95n.28, 95, 99–101,
109–10n.69, 110n.73, 111–12n.82
object of intention, 109–10
ordinary concepts of, 93–98
overview, 13, 87, 115
passionate intentionality, lack of, 97
relation to bodily movements, 68–70
responsibility and582 Index
content of intention, suppositions
regarding, 105–14
nature of intention, suppositions
regarding, 98–105
role in assessment of, 87–89, 379–82
result elements of crimes and, 98–101, 99–101f
simultaneity requirement, 103
special part of criminal law and, 28–29
specific intent versus general intent, 94–95,
117, 119–20
substitution rules and, 110–11
unconscious brain events and, 74
usages of, 93–94
as voluntary action, 97
wrongdoing and, 88
Intentionality, 108, 108n.63, 111–12, 130
International Classification of Diseases, 10th
edition (ICD-10), 151, 152, 154–55,
156–57, 191, 192–93, 195–96, 199
Intoxication as defense, 322–23, 344
Involuntary intention, 97
Irresistible impulse
insanity defense and, 161, 162–64
volitional excuse and, 323
Islamic law, insanity defense in, 185
Jackson, Frank, 440–41n.10
James, William, 4–5, 15, 179, 223, 265–66, 361,
397, 411, 417
Jewish law, insanity defense in, 185
Johnson, Samuel, 52
Justification, volitional excuse
distinguished, 315
Kane, Robert, 267n.8, 299–300, 491n.32
Kant, Immanuel, 207–8, 276, 290–92, 300,
309–10, 318–19, 330, 355–56, 357, 508
Kaplan, David, 138
Kaplan, Leonard, 2–3
Keedy, Edwin, 107
Kennett, Jeanette, 501
Kim, Jaegwon, 445
Kleitman, Nathaniel, 399–400
Knowledge, intention versus, 130
Kolber, Adam, 2–3, 465n.63
Koob, George, 554–56, 565
Kornhuber, H.H., 218, 417–19
Kringelbach, Morten, 551
Kripke, Saul, 227–28, 470, 498–99
Lacey, Nicky, 32–33
“Lack of fair opportunity,” volitional excuse
versus, 317–22
Langdell, Christopher Columbus, 29–30
Lau, H.C., 220–21
Lavoisier, Antoine, 447
“Learning or habit” theories of addiction,
548–49, 566
“Legal wrong” doctrine, 111
Lehrer, Keith, 300–3, 305–6n.97, 416
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 348–49
Leshner, Alan, 488, 489–90
Lewis, David, 296, 297, 299, 305, 351–52, 357–58,
416, 425, 433–34, 559–60n.187
Liability
causation and, 37–38, 43
complicity liability, 46–48, 46t
conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t
culpability and, 44
inchoate liability, 44–46, 44t
obligation and, 43–44
as principle for completed crime, 41–44, 41t
strict liability offenses, 38–39
wrongdoing and, 44
Libertarian responses to determinism
causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72
compatibilist responses versus, 268
epistemic libetarianism, 272
metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69
occasional libertarianism, 270
overview, 14–15
patchy libertarianism, 270–71
selective libertarianism, 272–73
Libet, Benjamin, 6, 15, 217–18, 219–21, 232–33,
234, 237–38, 242–43, 382, 383–86,
389–90, 391, 394, 395, 396, 400, 404–5,
406, 407–8, 418–19
Libet experiments
data from, 217–21
determinism and, 231–33
epiphenomenal consciousness and, 237
epiphenomenal will and, 234
findings of, 382–83
folk psychology, challenges to
causally efficacious will, negation of, 386–89
free will, negation by unwilled brain
events, 384–86
overview, 383–84
phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390
privileged access, lack of, 389–90
questions regarding, 391
limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism
with responsibility and, 418
moral and legal relevance of, 393–94
Lilienfeld, Scott, 10, 11, 313–14
Limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism
with responsibility
Intention (Cont.)Index 583
ability to generally control past and, 426–28
control of strongly necessary and immediate
past and, 429–34
denial of control of past and, 428–29
Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432
noncausal control of epiphenomenal
forks, 420–25
overview, 15, 413–17
paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25,
428–29, 432
responses to claims of non-cause-based
control, 425–34
Locke, John, 179–80, 210–11
Logical positivism compatibilism, 283–86
Luther, Martin, 309
MacArthur Foundation, 1–2, 373
Mackie, J.L., 34–35, 431
Madness, insanity defense and
mental disorder, relation to, 191–97
moral agency and, 178–84 (See also Moral
agency)
per se eliminating or reducing
responsibility, 178–91
psychosis, relation to, 191–97
Maier, John, 296, 301n.86
Malice aforethought, 97
Marshall, Thurgood, 517–18
“Material elements” doctrine, 109–10n.69
Mayhem substitution rule, 111
McVeigh, Timothy, 202–3
Mechanism. See Reductionism
Melden, A.I., 420, 421
Mele, Al, 388–89, 404, 405–6n.57, 406
Mellor, Hugh, 68–69
Menninger, Karl, 5–6, 437–38
Mens rea. See Intention
Mental disorder
madness, relation to, 191–97
psychiatric purposes in defining, 152–55
relevance of medical definitions to
excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 167–74
Mental states. See also Intention
as brain states, 458–61
relation to bodily movements, 68–70
Menzies, Peter, 68–69
Metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69
Metaphysical reductionism, 212–13
Mill, John Stuart, 21, 23–24
Milner, Peter, 539, 542, 544
M’Naghten, Daniel, 144, 160, 164–65
Model Penal Code
belief versus intention and, 117–18, 129, 140
duress as defense, 344
general part of criminal law and, 38–39, 40–
41, 41n.83, 46, 48
insanity defense and, 161–64
intention and, 94, 95n.28, 95, 99–101, 109–
10n.69, 110n.73, 111–12n.82
necessity as defense, 316
voluntary action, 395n.31
Moore, G.E., 286–87, 288–89, 292–95, 298,
299, 309–10, 311, 325–26, 350,
353–55, 415–16
Moore, Michael, 248–61, 311, 502
Moral agency
autonomy requirement, 183–84
character structure and, 183
emotionality requirement, 183
insanity defense and, 178–84
intentionality requirement, 180–81
mental state requirement, 179
phenomenal experience requirement, 179–80
practical rationality and, 182–83
privileged access requirement, 180
soul and, 182
“Moral wrong” doctrine, 109–10n.69
Morris, Herbert, 197
Morris, Norval, 173n.83
Morse, Stephen, 6–7, 197, 273, 281, 282n.47,
285, 303–4, 309, 327, 355–56,
482–83, 489–90
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 532–33
MPC. See Model Penal Code
Multiple realizability, 77, 78, 79, 80–81, 444
Naess, Arne, 197
Nagel, Tom, 440–41n.10, 441–42
National Institute for Health, 477
National Opinion Research Center (University
of Chicago), 174
Necessity as defense, 316, 322–23
Netherlands, addiction as defense in, 478n.3
Neuroscience
addiction and
conclusions regarding, 571–72
continued drug use by addicts, explanation
of, 547–62
excuse, inferences regarding, 570
expansion of moral excuse and legal
defense based on, 562–68
explanation of addiction, 536–62
folk psychology explanations, potential for
changing, 534–36
moral excuse and legal defense, potential
for changing or justifying doctrines
of, 534–36584 Index
nonaddicted drug use that risks or causes
addiction, explanation of, 537–47
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and, 365–67,
557, 560–61, 563
anteroventral prefrontal cortex and, 365–67
blameworthiness, skepticism toward,
3–5, 7–9
challenges from, 14, 207–12, 225
“cheap compatibilism” and, 208–10, 248–61
consciousness not veridical or
privileged, 239–41
determinist challenges, 11, 228–33 (See also
Determinism)
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
addiction and, 557, 560–61, 563
compatibilism and, 297
volitional excuse and, 365–67, 368, 369–71
eliminative materialism, 244
epiphenomenalist challenges (See also
Epiphenomenalism)
overview, 11, 15, 417–20
phenomenal awareness, 237–38f, 244
purely epiphenomenal consciousness,
233f, 235f, 237–39, 244
purely epiphenomenal will, 233–36,
236f, 244
executive control functions, 365
fallibilist challenges
denial of more than occasional
correctness, 245
denial of privileged access, 245
denial of transparency and
incorrigibility, 245
overview, 11, 16
reductionism and, 438–39
frontopolar cortex and, 215, 220, 242
human agency, skepticism toward, 3–5, 7–9
Libet experiments
data from, 217–21
determinism and, 231–33
epiphenomenal consciousness and, 237
epiphenomenal will and, 234
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and, 557, 560–61
overconfidence in, 5–6
parietal cortex and, 170, 215, 220, 243,
295, 308
philosophy, skepticism toward, 6–7
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and, 297, 365–67,
559–61, 566
pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)
and, 215, 220
primary motor cortex and, 72, 215, 218
questions regarding challenges, 245–47
reductionism and (See also Reductionism)
actions as brain-caused bodily
movements, 451–58
challenges from, 11, 15, 207–17,
225–28, 244
dualism and, 461–63
eliminative materialism, 464
mental states as brain states, 458–61
metaphysical interpretation of
data, 461–64
overview, 437–39, 450–51, 473–74
reductionist interpretations, 461
retributive justice, challenges to, 207–8
right lateral orbitofrontal cortex and,
365–67, 369–70
secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267
supplementary motor area (SMA) and
determinism and, 231–33
Libet experiments and, 218, 220
limited compatibilism of
epiphenomenalism with responsibility
and, 417–19, 422–23, 430–31, 432
reductionism and, 215, 452, 456,
457–58, 463
tumors and, 368–69
ventromedial-orbitofrontal cortex
and, 365–67
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
and, 365–67, 368
volitional excuse and, 364–71, 373
Wegner experiments, 221–25
Newcomb’s Problem, 423–25, 432
New conditionalist compatibilism
apparent ability to do otherwise, 298–99
aversions, 300–1
classical compatibilism versus, 304–7
compulsive desires, 303
constitutive luck in having desires, 299–300
crazy desires and beliefs, 303–4
“finkish” dispositions, 299
“finkish” variations of obsessive desire/
aversion counterexamples, 301–3
infinite regress of choosing to choose to, 299
overview, 298
“sticky” versus “nonsticky” choices, 299
“unlucky” failures, 298
New Hampshire, medical model of legal
insanity in, 145, 174–75, 197–98
“New Mysterians,” 59–62
Newton, Isaac, 446–47
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 273, 529
Nisbett, R.E., 221
Neuroscience (Cont.)Index 585
Nomological reductionism, 213
Nonanalytical hard determinism, 244
“Nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45
Norway
Board of Forensic Medicine, 177
Commission on Forensic Medicine, 144–45
insanity law in (See Norway, insanity law in)
Parliamentary Commission on Reform of the
Insanity Laws of Norway, 143–44
Penal Code, 144–45n.3, 189–90, 193, 195,
198, 203n.185
Norway, insanity law in
medical model of legal insanity in, 145
what can be improved, 199–202
cognitive impairments as rule of thumb
only, 199–200
common-sense judgments, disguising
of, 201–2
proper medical diagnosis as
determinative, 199
psychiatrists, role of, 200–1
what is correct in, 197–99
limitation to very serious mental illness,
191, 198
mental illness not excusing criminal
action, 197–98
moral relevance of mental illness, 197
psychosis, relationship with serious mental
illness, 198–99
status defense, 198
Nozick, Robert, 210–11, 423, 424
Obligation, liability and, 43–44
Occasional libertarianism, 270
Odyssey (Homer), 541n.136
Olds, James, 539, 542, 544
Omission
as counterexample to causal theory of action
(CTA), 66–68
crimes of, 39
human agency and, 67–68n.47
Opioid addiction, 480–81
Oppenheim, Paul, 441–42
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 557, 560–61
Oslo University, 143–44
“Overshoot” problem. See Volitional excuse
Packer, Herbert, 275
Parietal cortex, 170, 215, 220, 243, 295, 308
Passionate intentionality, lack of, 97
Patchy libertarianism, 270–71
Paul (Saint), 343–44
Peel, Robert, 160, 164
Peerfield, Wilder, 72
Penfield, Wilder, 456
Pettit, Phil, 291, 299–300
Phenomenal awareness
alleged epiphenomenal status of, 410
Libet experiments and, 390
as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of
bodily movements, 397–98
neuroscience, challenges from, 237–38f, 244
Philosophy, skepticism of neuroscience
toward, 6–7
Physicalism
classically reductionist physicalism, 441–43
componential mechanism, 448–49
eliminative materialism, 445–48
“grounding,” 449–50
“nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45
overview, 440–41
skeptical physicalism, 445–48
Pinker, Steven, 208–10
Pinkerton doctrine, 50
Plato, 182
Portugal, addiction as defense in, 478n.3
Posner, Richard, 29–30
Practical rationality schema of
addiction, 490–97
immediate etiology of rational action,
491–93f, 493–95
prehistory of actions in terms of long-term
causes, 490–91, 490–91f
Preconscious actions, addiction and,
500–1, 519–20
Prefrontal cortex (PFC), 297, 365–67,
559–61, 566
Pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA),
215, 220
Preventive justice, retributive justice versus, 1–3
Primary motor cortex, 72, 215, 218
Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP),
267n.8, 267n.9, 282n.47, 287, 288, 290,
291, 300, 415–16
Privileged access
fallibilism and, 245
Libet experiments and, 389–90
as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of
bodily movements, 394–97
moral agency, requirement for, 180
Property law, moral desert and, 210–11
Provocation as defense, 40–41, 322–23
Psychology
blameworthiness and, 4–5
human agency and, 4–5
special part of criminal law compared, 27–28586 Index
Psychosis
madness, relation to, 191–97
psychiatric purposes in defining, 155–58
relevance of medical definitions to
excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 174–78
Punishment
insanity defense and
mental disorder, 167–74
particular mental diseases, 166
psychosis, 174–78
strong relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 166–78
weak relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 158–66
mixed theory of, 19–20, 148
retributive justice
addiction and, 569
challenges from neuroscience, 207–8
overview, 19–20, 147–48
preventive justice versus, 1–3
utilitarianism and, 209–10
theory of, 23–24
utilitarianism and, 3, 147–48
Putnam, Hilary, 123, 415, 441–42
Ramachandran, V.S., 392–93
Rangel, Antonio, 368, 372, 460
Rational choice model of addiction, 497–99
Ravizza, Mark, 309–10
Raz, Joseph, 31, 32, 34, 342–43n.77
Readiness Potential (RP), 218, 219, 219–20n.52,
220–21, 382, 383, 401, 404, 406,
417, 430–32
Reagan, Ronald, 144
Reciprocal innervation, 453–54
Reductionism
analytical reductionism, 212–13
determinism and, 438–39
epiphenomenalism and, 438–39
fallibilism and, 438–39
metaphysical reductionism, 212–13
mind-brain metaphysical views as sources of
challenge
classically reductionist
physicalism, 441–43
componential mechanism, 448–49
eliminative materialism, 445–48
“grounding,” 449–50
“nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45
overview, 440–41
skeptical physicalism, 445–48
neuroscience and
actions as brain-caused bodily
movements, 451–58
challenges from, 11, 15, 207–17,
225–28, 244
dualism and, 461–63
eliminative materialism, 464
mental states as brain states, 458–61
metaphysical interpretation of
data, 461–64
overview, 437–39, 450–51, 473–74
reductionist interpretations, 461
nomological reductionism, 213
responsibility, implications for
dualism and, 466–68
framing of question, 465–66
reduction as demotion, 468–70
skeptical reductions and, 470–73
Reefer Madness (film), 547
Responsibility
blameworthiness and, 90–91
epiphenomenalism, moral and legal
relevance of claims of
overview, 391–92
phenomenal awareness of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 397–98
privileged access of will as merely
epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily
movements, 394–97
will as merely epiphenomenal and not
causal of bodily movements, 392–94
fictionalist responses to determinism
and, 280–81
insanity defense and
mental disorder, 167–74
particular mental diseases, 166
psychosis, 174–78
strong relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 166–78
weak relevance of medical definitions
to excuse from responsibility and
punishment, 158–66
intention and
content of intention, suppositions
regarding, 105–14
nature of intention, suppositions
regarding, 98–105
role in assessment of, 87–89, 379–82
limited compatibilism of
epiphenomenalism with
ability to generally control past
and, 426–28Index 587
control of strongly necessary and
immediate past and, 429–34
denial of control of past and, 428–29
Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432
noncausal control of epiphenomenal
forks, 420–25
overview, 15, 413–17
paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25,
428–29, 432
responses to claims of non-cause-based
control, 425–34
reductionism, implications of
dualism and, 466–68
framing of question, 465–66
reduction as demotion, 468–70
skeptical reductionism and, 470–73
usages of, 89, 89f
volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t
Retributive justice
addiction and, 569
challenges from neuroscience, 207–8
overview, 19–20, 147–48
preventive justice versus, 1–3
utilitarianism and, 209–10
Right lateral orbitofrontal cortex,
365–67, 369–70
Robinson, Paul, 515n.78
Rorty, Richard, 181n.116
Rosen, Gideon, 449, 528–29
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
(UK), 178, 187
Rubicon Point, 219, 232–33, 385, 407
Rygnestad, Tarjei, 177
Ryle, Gilbert, 466–67
Sachs, Davis, 183n.125
Sapolsky, Robert, 1–3
Satel, Sally, 10, 11, 313–14
Sayre-McCord, Geoff, 471
Schaffer, Jonathan, 124, 449
Schelling, Thomas, 341–43
Schizophrenia, psychiatric purposes in
defining, 150–52
Schlick, Moritz, 284, 309–10
Scholastics, 180–81
Secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267
Secondary rules, 30
Selective determinism, insanity defense
and, 172–73
Selective libertarianism, 272–73
Self-defense, 322–23
Sherrington, Charles, 213–14, 453–55, 462–63
Shoemaker, David, 426n.27
Simultaneity requirement, 103
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 513n.73
Skeptical physicalism, 445–48
Skinner, B.F., 4–6, 15, 226–27, 411, 417, 438,
464, 464n.61, 470–71
Smith, Michael, 305–7, 309–10, 337–38,
358, 416
Snell’s Law, 441–42
Soerensen, Per Balch, 203n.184, 203n.186
Sorheim, Synne, 192, 193–94
Sorites Paradox, 447–48
Source compatibilism, 307–10
Special part of criminal law
action and, 28–29
belief and, 28–29
deontic ethics and, 31–35
general part as descriptive theory of, 27–35
characteristics of, 36
“content-neutral” terms in special
part, 27–30
criteria for, 35–41
moral aspect of, 31–35
overview, 23–24
possibility of, 35–41
general part versus, 21, 22–23
intention and, 28–29
psychology compared, 27–28
secondary rules and, 30
Specific intent versus general intent, 94–95,
117, 119–20
Sperry, Roger, 215–16n.39
Spitzer, Bob, 152, 153–54
Status excuses, volitional excuse and, 323
Staub, Hugo, 274–75
Stein, Alex, 467, 468
Stephens, James Fitzjames, 20–21, 37, 41
Steward, Helen, 68–70
Stewart, J., 542–43
Stewart, Potter, 485–86
Stich, Steven, 464n.60
Strawson, Peter, 270–71, 278–79, 280, 488–89
Strict liability offenses, 38–39
Sturgeon, Nicholas, 248
Substance use disorders, 480–81
Substitution rules, 110–11
Supervenience, 444–45
Supplementary motor area (SMA)
determinism and, 231–33
Libet experiments and, 218, 220
limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism
with responsibility and, 417–19, 422–23,
430–31, 432
reductionism and, 215
Surgeon General, 477
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), 524588 Index
Synchronic weakness of will, 342–43, 348, 353,
507–8, 507n.64
Tadros, Victor, 318–19, 338
Talmud, 118, 127
Taylor, Richard, 61, 299–300
Thomson, Judith, 123
Tittle, Charles, 362–64
Torrissen, Terje, 192, 193–94
Tort law
criminal law compared, 51
moral desert and, 210–11
transferred intent rule in, 113–14
Transferred intent rule, 113–14
Trump, Donald, 460n.49
United Kingdom, Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment, 178, 187
University of Chicago, 174
University of Michigan, 539–40
Utilitarianism
insanity defense and, 149
punishment and, 3, 147–48
retributive justice and, 209–10
Van Inwagen, Peter, 267n.9, 413
Ventromedial-orbitofrontal cortex, 365–67
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
365–67, 368
Veto function, 396–97n.37, 407–8
Victoria (UK), 144, 160, 186–87
Vihvelin, Kadri, 265–66, 274, 296, 302, 305, 307,
309–10, 416
Vincent, Nicole, 2–3
Volitional excuse
cognitive excuse distinguished, 315, 317
conational excuse distinguished, 317–22
counterfactual conditionals to analyze
incapacity in folk psychology models
binary distinctions and, 355–57
counterfactual analysis of ability, 348–50
free action, 353–55
free will, 350–53
implications of possible worlds
analysis, 355–60
nature of possible worlds analysis
and, 357–60
relevant counterfactual for ability to act
otherwise, 353–55
relevant counterfactual for ability to
choose otherwise, 350–53
culpability and, 315–16, 315t
dependence on “can’t/won’t” distinction
actor could not have done
otherwise, 324–27
domain of excuse, 314–17
domain of volitional excuse, 317–22
legal defenses involving, 322–23
underlying principle of volitional
excuse, 324–27
experimental psychology, usefulness of,
361–64, 373
folk psychology of
conflicting intentions, 332, 335–36
“ego-alien” desires and, 332–33, 337–40
inability to execute right
intention, 340–45
inability to form right intention, 331–40
lack of intention, 332, 333–35
models of compelled choice and action,
345–48, 345t
overview, 313–14, 327
psychology of conflicting desires where
responsibility exists, 328–29
“sticky” intentions and, 342–43,
342–43n.77
strength of desire, 329–31
volitional incapacity and, 373
wishful thinking and, 332, 336–37
insanity defense and, 322–23
involuntary action distinguished, 315
irresistible impulse and, 323
justification distinguished, 315
“lack of fair opportunity” versus, 317–22
neuroscience, usefulness of, 364–71, 373
overview, 15, 313–14, 372
responsibility and, 315–16, 315t
status excuses and, 323
ultraconservative interpretation, 324–27
ultraliberal interpretation, 324–27
volitional incapacity and, 373
wrongdoing and, 315–16, 315t
Volitional incapacity, 373
Volkow, Nora, 550, 561
Wallace, Jay, 309–10
Ward, David, 362–64
Watson, Gary, 267
Wegner, Daniel, 221–25, 234, 236, 239–41,
240–41n.118, 500–1, 502
Wegner experiments, 221–25
White, Byron, 478–79
Willed stillness, 63
Williams, Glanville, 20–22, 37, 41, 53Index 589
Willpower, 354, 354n.90, 561–62, 561n.190
Wilson, T.D., 221
Wise, Roy, 539–40, 542–43,
545n.145, 554–55
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 482
The Wizard of Oz (film), 364–67, 371
World Health Organization, 151, 152, 192
Wrongdoing
defense, confusion with, 568–69
intention and, 88
liability and, 44
volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t
Yaffe, Gideon, 13, 74, 76–85, 120–21, 122,
129–40, 134n.59, 136n.64, 137n.65,
138–39n.74, 513–14, 517–18n.80,
528n.94, 565–66n.194
Yokel, Robert, 539–40
Zimmerman, Michael, 31, 32, 528–29
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