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 | موضوع: كتاب Mechanical Choices - The Responsibility of the Human Machine السبت 02 أبريل 2022, 6:10 pm | |
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أخواني في الله أحضرت لكم كتاب Mechanical Choices - The Responsibility of the Human Machine MICHAEL S. MOORE University of Illinois
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Index Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages. Accomplice liability, 46–48, 46t Action bodily movements actions as brain-caused bodily movements, 451–58 as essential to action, 63–68 as means of change, 74–75 as object that intention is causing, 70–75 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 relation of intention to, 68–70 causal theory of action (CTA) (See Causal theory of action [CTA]) general part of criminal law and, 39–40 human agency compared, 39–40 overview, 13, 57 special part of criminal law and, 28–29 “Actish” phenomenal feel, 76, 77–78, 79–80, 81–82, 83, 85 Actus reus. See Action Addiction “addiction gene” and, 546n.149 automaticity models cravings as emotion-driven bypassing of intention, 502 frozen beliefs and, 504–5 halfway to intention models, 503 overview, 500 preconscious actions, 500–1 too many versus too few intentions, 501 brain dysfunction and, 535–36 conceptualization of, 479–90 “dark side of addiction” theory, 554–57, 565 “demon drug” story, 538–44, 538–39n.124, 547 disability and, 557–58 disease model of addiction, 483–89, 535 dopamine and, 539–41, 542, 543, 544–46, 544n.144, 545nn.145–146, 545n.148, 547 “ego-alien” desires and, 566–67 executive control functions and, 561–62 failures of actions to match intentions, 507–8 failures of experiential satisfaction to match desires and choices, 508–9 failures of intentions to match desires or values cognitive failure, 504 motivational failure, 504–5 normative failure, 506 overview, 504 folk psychology explanations of combination of, 509–10 conclusions regarding, 570–71 less than full practical rationality, 499–509 neuroscience, potential of for changing, 534–36 overview, 490 practical rationality schema, 490–97 rational choice model, 497–99 Helping to End Addiction Long-Term (HEAL) Initiative, 477 “hijacking” and, 541–44 imbalance explanation, 550–51, 564 impairment and, 557–58 incentive salience theory, 547–54, 556–57, 564–65 incompatibilism and, 487–89 “learning or habit” theories, 548–49, 566 less than full practical rationality, 499–509 medical definition of, 482–83, 489–90 as moral excuse and legal defense acting against own intentions, 530–33 addicts most desiring or valuing what they do not like, 533–34 akratic addicts, 530–33 “automatic pilot,” addicts acting on, 519–23 capacity not to have cravings and, 511–12574 Index choices not matching desires or values, 523–30 cognitive failures and, 523–25 conclusions regarding, 571 dual intentions automaticity, 522–23 emotion-caused automaticity, 520–22 fully rational addict, 518–19 habits and, 519–20 as legal defense, 322–23, 478–79, 478nn.3–4, 478–79n.7 motivational failures and, 525–28 neuroscience, potential of for changing or justifying doctrine of, 534–36 normative failures and, 528–30 overview, 322–23, 510–11, 517–18 preconscious actions and, 519–20 questions regarding, 510–11 rejected arguments, 511–17 responsibility for addition in first place and, 514–17 withdrawal and, 512–14 wrongdoing, confusion with, 568–69 neuroscience and conclusions regarding, 571–72 continued drug use by addicts, explanation of, 547–62 excuse, inferences regarding, 570 expansion of moral excuse and legal defense based on, 562–68 explanation of addiction, 536–62 folk psychology explanations, potential for changing, 534–36 moral excuse and legal defense, potential for changing or justifying doctrines of, 534–36 nonaddicted drug use that risks or causes addiction, explanation of, 537–47 opioid addiction, 480–81 overview, 16, 477–79, 568–72 Powell v. Texas, 517–18n.80 practical rationality schema, 490–97 immediate etiology of rational action, 491–93f, 493–95 prehistory of actions in terms of long-term causes, 490–91, 490–91f rational choice model, 497–99 Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 519n.84 retributive justice and, 569 Robinson v. California, 485–86 statistics regarding, 477–78 substance use disorders, 480–81 “subsystems in conflict” explanation, 550n.159 willpower and, 561–62, 561n.190 “Addiction gene,” 546n.149 Agency human agency (See Human agency) moral agency (See Moral agency) secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267 Akratic addicts, 530–33 Alces, Peter, 2–3 Aleska, Valentina, 363–64 Alexander, Bruce, 538–39n.124 Alexander, Franz, 274–75 American Law Institute, 161, 162–64, 395n.31 American Medical Association, 326–27n.38 American Psychiatric Association, 151, 152, 153, 154–55, 326–27n.38, 477–78, 480, 484 An American Tragedy (Dreiser), 502 Analytical hard determinism, 244 Analytical reductionism, 212–13 Andreasen, Nancy, 535–36 Animals, analogy to in insanity defense, 185–86 Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 365–67, 557, 560–61, 563 Anteroventral prefrontal cortex, 365–67 Aquinas, Thomas, 121–22, 129, 268–69 Aretaic morality, 65–66n.38 Aristotle, 53, 159, 175–77, 182, 290–91, 314–15, 317, 523–24, 527 Armstrong, David, 61, 68–69, 443–44 Arnold, Edward, 185–86 Ascriptive morality, 19–20, 57, 208, 380 Aspaas, Agnar, 192, 193–94 “Astonishing hypothesis,” 437–38. See also Reductionism Austin, J.L., 52–53, 284, 290–91, 293–94, 298–99, 341, 349, 416 Automaticity models of addiction cravings as emotion-driven bypassing of intention, 502 frozen beliefs and, 504–5 halfway to intention models, 503 overview, 500 preconscious actions, 500–1 too many versus too few intentions, 501 Ayer, A.J., 284, 309–10 Bargh, John, 221, 223, 500–1, 502 Battery-assault interchange, 111 Baumeister, Roy, 561n.190 Bechtel, Bill, 448 Addiction (Cont.)Index 575 Becker, Gary, 498 Belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation, 72, 98–103, 99–103f Belief versus intention as to circumstances, 128–41 commitment criterion, 130–33 intention-based commitments, 129–40 intention criterion, 133–141 motivation and, 129–30, 132 overview, 95 salience and, 137–39 legal belief versus factual belief, 112 Model Penal Code and, 117–18, 129, 140 overview, 13, 117–18 as to result, 118–27 change in meaning of intention and, 122 closeness doctrine and, 122–27 “common sense” possibility, 126–27 content of intention and, 122–27 Duff ’s hypothetical, 119 Herod/John the Baptist hypothetical, 118, 119, 120–23 optimistic version, 120–22 overview, 95 skeptical version, 120–22 special part of criminal law and, 28–29 specific intent versus general intent, 117, 119–20 United States v. Fountain, 128–29 Bennett, Jonathan, 126–27 Bentham, Jeremy, 3, 109, 122, 128n.43 Berker, Selim, 449 Berridge, Kent, 503, 508–9, 523, 526–27, 533, 551, 557, 564–65 Bickel, Warren, 550–51 Bittner, T., 401 Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne, 240 Blameworthiness culpability and, 92 epiphenomenalism, moral and legal relevance of claims of overview, 391–92 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 392–94 insanity defense and, 167, 168 intention and, 89 psychology and, 4–5 responsibility and, 90–91 skepticism of neuroscience toward, 3–5, 7–9 Bleuler, Manfred, 184 Bodily movements actions as brain-caused bodily movements, 451–58 as essential to action, 63–68 as means of change, 74–75 as object that intention is causing, 70–75 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 relation of intention to, 68–70 Bonnie, Richard, 326–27n.38 Boyle’s Law, 441–42 de Bracton, Henry, 185–86 Bradley, F.H., 52 Brainwashing, 527n.93 Bratman, Michael, 62, 380–81, 495–96 Breivik, Andres, 143–44, 156, 177, 189, 192, 193–97, 199, 202–3 Brentano, Franz, 181 Brooks, David, 9–10, 11 Butler, Samuel, 167–68, 484–85, 486 Cacioppo, John, 567–68n.196 California Privacy Act, 109 Calvinism, 228, 265 Canada, addiction as defense in, 478n.3 Cane, Peter, 32–33, 34, 37, 41 Cardozo, Benjamin, 96–97n.37 Cashmore, Tony, 7 Causal laws, 413 Causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72 Causal theory of action (CTA) bodily movements actions as brain-caused bodily movements, 451–58 as essential to action, 63–68 as means of change, 74–75 as object that intention is causing, 70–75 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 relation of intention to, 68–70576 Index causal relevance and, 68, 69–70 displacement refraining and, 64 mental actions and, 65–66 mind-brain interface machines and, 63–64 normative implications of, 58 omission and, 66–68 overview, 57–59 rejection by “New Mysterians,” 59–62 resisting and, 64 willed but indirectly caused bodily changes and, 64 willed stillness and, 63 Causation belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation, 72, 98–103, 99–103f deviant causal chains, 71, 72, 76–85, 103, 381 insanity defense and, 169–74 freedom of mentally ill offenders, 170–71 ideology, 172–73 ignorance regarding mental illness, 172 selective determinism, 172–73 strength of mental illness as cause, 170 sufficiency of mental illness as cause, 171–72 liability and, 37–38, 43 Centre for the Study of the Human Mind (Oslo University), 143–44 Chalmers, David, 440–41n.10 Chamlin, Mitchell, 363–64 Charles’s Law, 441–42 “Cheap compatibilism,” 208–10, 248–61, 274 Children immaturity as defense, 322–23, 344 insanity defense, analogy to in, 185, 186 Chisholm, Robert, 289–90, 298–300, 416 Choudhury, Suparna, 240 Churchland, Patricia, 464n.60 Churchland, Paul, 464n.60 Classical compatibilism with amendments to avoid objections, 311 conditionalizing “could,” 287–92 from “could have. . .if. . .” to “would have. . .if. . . ,” 292–96 counterfactuals, 296–98 new conditionalist compatibilism versus, 304–7 overview, 286–87 Classically reductionist physicalism, 441–43 Cleese, John, 225–26 Clemenceau, Georges, 209 Closeness doctrine, 122–27 Cochran, John, 363–64 Cognitive excuse, volitional excuse distinguished, 315, 317 Cohen, Jonathan, 2, 7–8, 9, 216–17, 226, 228–29, 248, 438, 458–59, 460 Coke, Edward (Lord), 185–86 Compatibilism “cheap compatibilism,” 208–10, 248–61, 274 classical compatibilism with amendments to avoid objections, 311 conditionalizing “could,” 287–92 from “could have...if...” to “would have... if...,” 292–96 counterfactuals, 296–98 new conditionalist compatibilism versus, 304–7 overview, 286–87 duress and, 285 incompatibilism versus, 282–83 libertarian responses versus, 268 limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with responsibility ability to generally control past and, 426–28 control of strongly necessary and immediate past and, 429–34 denial of control of past and, 428–29 Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432 noncausal control of epiphenomenal forks, 420–25 overview, 15, 413–17 paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25, 428–29, 432 responses to claims of non-cause-based control, 425–34 logical positivism compatibilism, 283–86 new conditionalist compatibilism apparent ability to do otherwise, 298–99 aversions, 300–1 classical compatibilism versus, 304–7 compulsive desires, 303 constitutive luck in having desires, 299–300 crazy desires and beliefs, 303–4 “finkish” dispositions, 299 “finkish” variations of obsessive desire/ aversion counterexamples, 301–3 infinite regress of choosing to choose to, 299 overview, 298 “sticky” versus “nonsticky” choices, 299 “unlucky” failures, 298 “overshoot” problem (See Volitional excuse) overview, 14, 268, 310 Causal theory of action (CTA) (Cont.)Index 577 source compatibilism, 307–10 supposed irrelevance of freedom to do or will otherwise, 307–10 volitional excuse and (See Volitional excuse) Complicity liability, 46–48, 46t Componential mechanism, 448–49 Conational excuse, volitional excuse distinguished, 317–22 Conditional intentions, 110 Consciousness, intention and, 104–5 Consent as defense, 40 Conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t Contract law criminal law compared, 51, 51n.104 intention in, 69–70n.59, 88–89 moral desert and, 210–11 Contributory negligence, 36 Craver, Carl, 448 Crick, Francis, 225, 437–38, 442, 449–50, 468–69 Criminal law blameworthiness (See Blameworthiness) contract law compared, 51, 51n.104 culpability (See Culpability) defenses (See Defenses) descriptive theories of law and (See Descriptive theories of law) dualism in, 467–68 general part (See General part of criminal law) insanity defense (See Insanity defense) liability (See Liability) Model Penal Code (See Model Penal Code) omission, crimes of, 39 overview, 12, 19–20 punishment (See Punishment) responsibility (See Responsibility) retributive justice (See Retributive justice) special part (See Special part of criminal law) strict liability offenses, 38–39 tort law compared, 51 wrongdoing (See Wrongdoing) Culpability belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation and, 98–103, 99–103f blameworthiness and, 92 circumstance elements of crimes and, 101–3, 101–3f intention and, 87–88, 89–92, 103 liability and, 44 result elements of crimes and, 98–101, 99–101f usages of, 91–92 volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t Damasio, Tony, 367, 460 Danto, Arthur, 248–49, 430–31 “Dark side of addiction” theory, 554–57, 565 Davidson, Donald, 62, 64–65, 290, 290n.63, 291, 330, 331, 333, 505n.58, 506 Dawkins, Richard, 225–26 Deecke, L., 218, 417–19 Defenses addiction, 322–23, 478–79, 478nn.3–4, 478–79n.7 (See also Addiction) consent, 40 diminished capacity, 322–23 diminished responsibility, 322–23 duress, 40, 285, 316, 322–23, 344 immaturity, 322–23, 344 insanity (See Insanity defense) intoxication, 322–23, 344 necessity, 316, 322–23 provocation, 40–41, 322–23 self-defense, 322–23 volitional excuse, legal defenses involving, 322–23 wrongdoing, confusion with, 568–69 Delaney, Neil, 127 Deliberate and premeditated intentionality, 96–97 Dement, William C., 399–400 “Demon drug” story, 538–44, 538–39n.124, 547 Dennett, Daniel, 3, 227, 240, 248–61, 279–80, 309, 464n.60, 472–73, 527n.93 Denno, Deborah, 2–3 Deontic ethics, 31–35 Descartes, René, 61 Descriptive theories of law authority of law and, 25–26 characteristics of, 25–26 deductive structure, 25 equality and, 26 general part of criminal law as descriptive theory of special part, 27–35 characteristics of, 36 “content-neutral” terms in special part, 27–30 criteria for, 35–41 moral aspect of, 31–35 overview, 23–24 possibility of, 35–41 greater determinateness and, 25–26 knowability of law and, 26 overview, 24–26 values in, 26578 Index Determinism analytical hard determinism, 244 challenges from neuroscience, 11, 228–33 compatibilist responses to (See Compatibilism) epiphenomenalism versus, 413–17 fictionalist responses to “cheap compatibilism” and, 274 fictional posits of each autonomous discipline, 274–76 linguistic fictionalism, 276–78 overview, 14–15, 274 pragmatic fictionalism, 279–80 responsibility and, 280–81 social practice/psychological attitude fictionalism, 278–79 transcendental fictionalism, 276 incapacity to act otherwise, argument from, 266, 267 lack of ultimate self-determination, argument from, 266 libertarian responses to causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72 compatibilist responses versus, 268 epistemic libertarianism, 272 metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69 occasional libertarianism, 270 overview, 14–15 patchy libertarianism, 270–71 selective libertarianism, 272–73 manipulation by secondary agents, argument from, 267 nonanalytical hard determinism, 244 reductionism and, 438–39 volitional excuse and (See Volitional excuse) Deviant causal chains, 71, 72, 76–85, 103, 381 Diachronic weakness of will, 342–43, 348, 353, 507–8, 507n.64 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 1st edition (DSM-I), 151, 155–56 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3rd edition (DSM-III), 152, 153, 154–55, 484 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th edition (DSM-IV), 156, 191, 192 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th edition (DSM-V), 151, 155–56, 480, 482–83 Diamond, Bernard, 5–6 Diminished capacity as defense, 322–23 Diminished responsibility as defense, 322–23 Disease model of addiction, 483–89, 535 District of Columbia Circuit Court Durham test in, 162–63, 162–63n.64 medical model of legal insanity in, 145–46, 174–75, 197–98 Doctrine of Double Effect, 88 Dolores Claiborne (film), 479–80n.9 Dopamine, 539–41, 542, 543, 544–46, 544n.144, 545nn.145–146, 545n.148, 547 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) addiction and, 557, 560–61, 563 compatibilism and, 297 volitional excuse and, 365–67, 368, 369–71 Double jeopardy, 123 Douglas, William, 486 Dreaming, 399–400 Dreiser, Theodore, 502 Drummond, Edward, 160 Dualism, 440–41, 440–41n.10, 461–63, 466–68 Duff, Anthony, 20–21n.8, 40–41, 53, 65, 66, 119, 318–19, 320–21n.21 Duress as defense, 40, 285, 316, 322–23, 344 Durham experiment, 145–46 Eagleman, David, 2, 3–4, 7–9, 10, 11 Eccles, John, 62, 462–63 “Ego-alien” desires, 332–33, 337–40, 566–67 Electroencephalograms (EEG), 218, 382, 399–400, 417–18 Eliminative materialism, 244, 445–48, 464 Elmer, Martin, 220 Epiphenomenalism determinism versus, 413–17 Libet experiments, challenges from causally efficacious will, negation of, 386–89 free will, negation by unwilled brain events, 384–86 overview, 383–84 phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390 privileged access, lack of, 389–90 questions regarding, 391 limited compatibilism with responsibility ability to generally control past and, 426–28 control of strongly necessary and immediate past and, 429–34 denial of control of past and, 428–29 Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432 noncausal control of epiphenomenal forks, 420–25 overview, 15, 413–17 paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25, 428–29, 432 responses to claims of non-cause-based control, 425–34Index 579 moral and legal relevance of claims overview, 391–92 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 392–94 neuroscience, challenges from overview, 11, 15, 417–20 phenomenal awareness, 237–38f, 244 purely epiphenomenal consciousness, 233f, 235f, 237–39, 244 purely epiphenomenal will, 233–36, 236f, 244 overview, 411 reductionism and, 438–39 truth of epiphenomenal claims nonobservational knowledge, alleged epiphenomenal status of, 405–10 overview, 398 phenomenal awareness, alleged epiphenomenal status of, 410 will, alleged epiphenomenal status of, 398–405 Epistemic libertarianism, 272 Executive control functions, 365, 561–62 Experimental psychology, volitional excuse and, 361–64, 373 Falk, Jerry, 568n.197 Fallibilism denial of more than occasional correctness, 245 denial of privileged access, 245 denial of transparency and incorrigibility, 245 overview, 11, 16 reductionism and, 438–39 Farah, Martha, 7 Feinberg, Joel, 197, 414–15 Felony/murder rule, 111 Fictionalist responses to determinism “cheap compatibilism” and, 274 fictional posits of each autonomous discipline, 274–76 linguistic fictionalism, 276–78 overview, 14–15, 274 pragmatic fictionalism, 279–80 responsibility and, 280–81 social practice/psychological attitude fictionalism, 278–79 transcendental fictionalism, 276 Fine, Kit, 68–69, 449 Fingarette, Herbert, 197, 338, 490 Fischer, John Martin, 309–10 Fleming, Stephen, 10–11 Fletcher, George, 27, 37, 53, 467–68n.73 Fodor, Jerry, 183–84n.127 Folk psychology action and, 57, 69–70 addiction, explanations of combination of, 509–10 conclusions regarding, 570–71 less than full practical rationality, 499–509 neuroscience, potential of for changing, 534–36 overview, 490 practical rationality schema, 490–97 rational choice model, 497–99 belief versus intention and, 117–18, 119, 120–21, 128, 141 criminal law and, 19–20 determinism (See Determinism) epiphenomenalism (See Epiphenomenalism) fallibilism (See Fallibilism) intention and, 87, 98–99, 101 Libet experiments, challenges from causally efficacious will, negation of, 386–89 free will, negation by unwilled brain events, 384–86 overview, 383–84 phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390 privileged access, lack of, 389–90 questions regarding, 391 moral agency and, 180 neuroscience and, 211–12, 217, 234, 236, 239 overview, 4–5, 12–13, 14 reductionism (See Reductionism) volitional excuse and (See Volitional excuse) Foot, Philippa, 109, 126 Foreseeable second crime doctrine, 48 Fox, Dov, 467, 468 Frankfurt, Harry, 295, 308, 308n.99, 309–10, 337–38, 360, 415–16, 506, 529 Free will negation by unwilled brain events, 384–86 volitional excuse and, 350–53 Freud, Sigmund, 4–6, 15, 16, 143, 179, 221, 223, 238, 242–43, 338–39, 385–86, 394–95, 395nn.33–34, 397, 402, 408n.60, 411, 417, 438, 496–97, 529–30, 542–43, 566–67 Frontopolar cortex, 215, 220, 242580 Index Fumerton, Richard, 464n.60 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 557, 566 Gage, Phineas, 364–68, 370–71, 459–60, 460n.49 Gardner, John, 22 Gazzaniga, Mike, 216, 280–81 General intent versus specific intent, 94–95, 117, 119–20 General part of criminal law action and, 39–40 Anglo-American theories of, 20–22 complicity liability for procuring or aiding, 46–48, 46t consent as defense and, 40 conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t content of, 41–50 as descriptive theory of special part, 27–35 characteristics of, 36 “content-neutral” terms in special part, 27–30 criteria for, 35–41 moral aspect of, 31–35 overview, 23–24 possibility of, 35–41 duress as defense and, 40 inchoate liability for trying or risking, 44–46, 44t intention and, 38–39 liability as principle for completed crime, 40t, 41–44, 41t Model Penal Code and, 38–39, 40–41, 41n.83, 46, 48 provocation as defense and, 40–41 specialness of, 50–53 special part versus, 21, 22–23 as theory of special part, 23–24 variety of theories of, 22–24 George III (UK), 144 Gide, Andre, 533 Glazebrook, Peter, 51n.104 Glueck, Sheldon, 170–71 Goldman, Alvin, 71–72 Goldstein, Abraham, 161, 201n.182 Gomes, Gilberto, 401, 403–4, 407, 409 Goodman, Nelson, 357–58 Grasmick, Harold, 362–64 Green, Stuart, 20–21n.8, 40–41 Greene, Josh, 2, 7–8, 9, 216–17, 226, 228–29, 248, 438, 458–59, 460 Grice, Paul, 62, 469–70, 471 Grievous bodily harm common law murder doctrine, 111 “Grounding,” 449–50 Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 151 Haggard, Patrick, 215–16n.38, 220, 231, 383–84 Hale, Matthew (Lord), 185 Hall, Jerome, 20–22, 37, 53, 275 Hannay, Alastair, 197 Harlow, John Martyn, 364–65n.111, 459–60 Hart, H.L.A., 19–20, 30, 126, 317, 569 Haynes, John-Dylan, 220–21, 242–43, 405, 418–19, 423, 432, 460 Hearst, Parry, 524, 527n.93 Heath, Robert G., 542n.137, 546n.151 Helping to End Addiction Long-Term (HEAL) Initiative, 477 Hempel, Carl Gustav, 441–42 “Hijacking,” addiction and, 541–44 Hill, Tom, 342n.76 Hills, Alison, 125–26n.31 Hinckley, John, 144 Hirstein, William, 164n.66 Hobbes, Thomas, 265, 385–86 Hollander, Paul, 173, 272–73 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 87–88, 209–10 Holton, Richard, 503, 508–9, 523, 526–27, 533, 564–66 Homer, 547 Honoré, Tony, 358 Hornsby, Jennifer, 420, 421 Human agency action compared, 39–40 “fishiness” regarding, 7–9 intention and, 88 omission and, 67–68n.47 psychology and, 4–5 skepticism of neuroscience toward, 3–5, 7–9 Hume, David, 227–28, 243, 286, 309–10, 325–26, 416, 420, 427–28, 470, 487, 498–99, 549 Hurd, Heidi, 88–89, 473–74n.82 Husak, Douglas, 29, 39, 53, 528–29 Husby, Torgeir, 192, 193–94 Huxley, Aldous, 497–98 Immaturity as defense, 323, 344 Incentive salience theory, 547–54, 556–57, 564–65 Inchoate liability, 44–46, 44t Incompatibilism, 282–83 Insanity defense animals, analogy to, 185–86 blameworthiness and, 167, 168 causation and, 169–74 freedom of mentally ill offenders, 170–71Index 581 ideology, 172–73 ignorance regarding mental illness, 172 selective determinism, 172–73 strength of mental illness as cause, 170 sufficiency of mental illness as cause, 171–72 children, analogy to, 185, 186 deific decree exception, 187–88 Dew v. Clark, 175 Durham test, 145–46, 162–63, 162–63n.64, 189 elements approach, 163 Hadfield’s Case, 175 Hinckley test, 162 irresistible impulse test, 161, 162–64 knowledge of right and wrong, 160–61, 162–64, 186–87 legal purposes in defining “insanity,” 147–49 morally innocent offenders, insulation of, 148 nondangerous and nondeterrable offenders, insulation of, 148 madness mental disorder, relation to, 191–97 moral agency and, 178–84 (See also Moral agency) per se eliminating or reducing responsibility, 178–91 psychosis, relation to, 191–97 medical model of legal insanity, 144–47, 174–75 mixed theory of punishment and, 148 M’Naghten test, 144, 158, 160–61, 162–64, 186–88 Model Penal Code test, 161–64 moral agency and, 178–84 in Norway (See Norway, insanity law in) overview, 13, 143–44 psychiatric purposes in defining terms, 149–58 hard cases purpose, 153 jurisdictional purpose, 153 legitimization purpose, 153, 157–58 “mental disorder,” 152–55 organismic dysfunction, 154 “psychosis,” 155–58 “schizophrenia,” 150–52 strategic purpose, 153 recommendations, 202–3 senses of practical rationality, 204 as status excuse, 188–89 strong relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 166–78 mental disorder, 167–74 particular mental diseases, 166 psychosis, 174–78 utilitarianism and, 149 volitional excuse and, 322–23 weak relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 158–66 Intention ambiguity regarding circumstances and, 94, 95 battery-assault interchange and, 111 belief-desire-intention (BDI) causation and, 98–103, 99–103f belief versus (See Belief versus intention) blameworthiness and, 89 bodily movement as object that intention is causing, 70–75 circumstance elements of crimes and, 101–3, 101–3f conditional intentions, 110 consciousness and, 104–5 in contract law, 69–70n.59, 88–89 culpability and, 87–88, 89–92, 103 deliberate and premeditated intentionality, 96–97 exercise of normative powers and, 88–89 experience and, 72–74 felony/murder rule and, 111 folk psychology and, 98–99, 101 foreseen consequences and, 94, 95 free nature of, 103–4 general part of criminal law and, 38–39 grievous bodily harm common law murder doctrine and, 111 human agency and, 88 intentionality, 108, 108n.63, 111–12, 130 intention-tokens, 105–6, 105–6n.60 involuntary intention, 97 knowledge versus, 130 legal concepts of, 93–98 “legal wrong” doctrine and, 111 malice aforethought, 97 “match” questions, 105–14 maxims of, 109–12 mayhem substitution rule and, 111 Model Penal Code and, 94, 95n.28, 95, 99–101, 109–10n.69, 110n.73, 111–12n.82 object of intention, 109–10 ordinary concepts of, 93–98 overview, 13, 87, 115 passionate intentionality, lack of, 97 relation to bodily movements, 68–70 responsibility and582 Index content of intention, suppositions regarding, 105–14 nature of intention, suppositions regarding, 98–105 role in assessment of, 87–89, 379–82 result elements of crimes and, 98–101, 99–101f simultaneity requirement, 103 special part of criminal law and, 28–29 specific intent versus general intent, 94–95, 117, 119–20 substitution rules and, 110–11 unconscious brain events and, 74 usages of, 93–94 as voluntary action, 97 wrongdoing and, 88 Intentionality, 108, 108n.63, 111–12, 130 International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition (ICD-10), 151, 152, 154–55, 156–57, 191, 192–93, 195–96, 199 Intoxication as defense, 322–23, 344 Involuntary intention, 97 Irresistible impulse insanity defense and, 161, 162–64 volitional excuse and, 323 Islamic law, insanity defense in, 185 Jackson, Frank, 440–41n.10 James, William, 4–5, 15, 179, 223, 265–66, 361, 397, 411, 417 Jewish law, insanity defense in, 185 Johnson, Samuel, 52 Justification, volitional excuse distinguished, 315 Kane, Robert, 267n.8, 299–300, 491n.32 Kant, Immanuel, 207–8, 276, 290–92, 300, 309–10, 318–19, 330, 355–56, 357, 508 Kaplan, David, 138 Kaplan, Leonard, 2–3 Keedy, Edwin, 107 Kennett, Jeanette, 501 Kim, Jaegwon, 445 Kleitman, Nathaniel, 399–400 Knowledge, intention versus, 130 Kolber, Adam, 2–3, 465n.63 Koob, George, 554–56, 565 Kornhuber, H.H., 218, 417–19 Kringelbach, Morten, 551 Kripke, Saul, 227–28, 470, 498–99 Lacey, Nicky, 32–33 “Lack of fair opportunity,” volitional excuse versus, 317–22 Langdell, Christopher Columbus, 29–30 Lau, H.C., 220–21 Lavoisier, Antoine, 447 “Learning or habit” theories of addiction, 548–49, 566 “Legal wrong” doctrine, 111 Lehrer, Keith, 300–3, 305–6n.97, 416 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 348–49 Leshner, Alan, 488, 489–90 Lewis, David, 296, 297, 299, 305, 351–52, 357–58, 416, 425, 433–34, 559–60n.187 Liability causation and, 37–38, 43 complicity liability, 46–48, 46t conspiracy liability, 48–50, 48t culpability and, 44 inchoate liability, 44–46, 44t obligation and, 43–44 as principle for completed crime, 41–44, 41t strict liability offenses, 38–39 wrongdoing and, 44 Libertarian responses to determinism causally dualist libertarianism, 271–72 compatibilist responses versus, 268 epistemic libetarianism, 272 metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69 occasional libertarianism, 270 overview, 14–15 patchy libertarianism, 270–71 selective libertarianism, 272–73 Libet, Benjamin, 6, 15, 217–18, 219–21, 232–33, 234, 237–38, 242–43, 382, 383–86, 389–90, 391, 394, 395, 396, 400, 404–5, 406, 407–8, 418–19 Libet experiments data from, 217–21 determinism and, 231–33 epiphenomenal consciousness and, 237 epiphenomenal will and, 234 findings of, 382–83 folk psychology, challenges to causally efficacious will, negation of, 386–89 free will, negation by unwilled brain events, 384–86 overview, 383–84 phenomenal awareness, lack of, 390 privileged access, lack of, 389–90 questions regarding, 391 limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with responsibility and, 418 moral and legal relevance of, 393–94 Lilienfeld, Scott, 10, 11, 313–14 Limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with responsibility Intention (Cont.)Index 583 ability to generally control past and, 426–28 control of strongly necessary and immediate past and, 429–34 denial of control of past and, 428–29 Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432 noncausal control of epiphenomenal forks, 420–25 overview, 15, 413–17 paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25, 428–29, 432 responses to claims of non-cause-based control, 425–34 Locke, John, 179–80, 210–11 Logical positivism compatibilism, 283–86 Luther, Martin, 309 MacArthur Foundation, 1–2, 373 Mackie, J.L., 34–35, 431 Madness, insanity defense and mental disorder, relation to, 191–97 moral agency and, 178–84 (See also Moral agency) per se eliminating or reducing responsibility, 178–91 psychosis, relation to, 191–97 Maier, John, 296, 301n.86 Malice aforethought, 97 Marshall, Thurgood, 517–18 “Material elements” doctrine, 109–10n.69 Mayhem substitution rule, 111 McVeigh, Timothy, 202–3 Mechanism. See Reductionism Melden, A.I., 420, 421 Mele, Al, 388–89, 404, 405–6n.57, 406 Mellor, Hugh, 68–69 Menninger, Karl, 5–6, 437–38 Mens rea. See Intention Mental disorder madness, relation to, 191–97 psychiatric purposes in defining, 152–55 relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 167–74 Mental states. See also Intention as brain states, 458–61 relation to bodily movements, 68–70 Menzies, Peter, 68–69 Metaphysical libertarianism, 268–69 Metaphysical reductionism, 212–13 Mill, John Stuart, 21, 23–24 Milner, Peter, 539, 542, 544 M’Naghten, Daniel, 144, 160, 164–65 Model Penal Code belief versus intention and, 117–18, 129, 140 duress as defense, 344 general part of criminal law and, 38–39, 40– 41, 41n.83, 46, 48 insanity defense and, 161–64 intention and, 94, 95n.28, 95, 99–101, 109– 10n.69, 110n.73, 111–12n.82 necessity as defense, 316 voluntary action, 395n.31 Moore, G.E., 286–87, 288–89, 292–95, 298, 299, 309–10, 311, 325–26, 350, 353–55, 415–16 Moore, Michael, 248–61, 311, 502 Moral agency autonomy requirement, 183–84 character structure and, 183 emotionality requirement, 183 insanity defense and, 178–84 intentionality requirement, 180–81 mental state requirement, 179 phenomenal experience requirement, 179–80 practical rationality and, 182–83 privileged access requirement, 180 soul and, 182 “Moral wrong” doctrine, 109–10n.69 Morris, Herbert, 197 Morris, Norval, 173n.83 Morse, Stephen, 6–7, 197, 273, 281, 282n.47, 285, 303–4, 309, 327, 355–56, 482–83, 489–90 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 532–33 MPC. See Model Penal Code Multiple realizability, 77, 78, 79, 80–81, 444 Naess, Arne, 197 Nagel, Tom, 440–41n.10, 441–42 National Institute for Health, 477 National Opinion Research Center (University of Chicago), 174 Necessity as defense, 316, 322–23 Netherlands, addiction as defense in, 478n.3 Neuroscience addiction and conclusions regarding, 571–72 continued drug use by addicts, explanation of, 547–62 excuse, inferences regarding, 570 expansion of moral excuse and legal defense based on, 562–68 explanation of addiction, 536–62 folk psychology explanations, potential for changing, 534–36 moral excuse and legal defense, potential for changing or justifying doctrines of, 534–36584 Index nonaddicted drug use that risks or causes addiction, explanation of, 537–47 anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and, 365–67, 557, 560–61, 563 anteroventral prefrontal cortex and, 365–67 blameworthiness, skepticism toward, 3–5, 7–9 challenges from, 14, 207–12, 225 “cheap compatibilism” and, 208–10, 248–61 consciousness not veridical or privileged, 239–41 determinist challenges, 11, 228–33 (See also Determinism) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and addiction and, 557, 560–61, 563 compatibilism and, 297 volitional excuse and, 365–67, 368, 369–71 eliminative materialism, 244 epiphenomenalist challenges (See also Epiphenomenalism) overview, 11, 15, 417–20 phenomenal awareness, 237–38f, 244 purely epiphenomenal consciousness, 233f, 235f, 237–39, 244 purely epiphenomenal will, 233–36, 236f, 244 executive control functions, 365 fallibilist challenges denial of more than occasional correctness, 245 denial of privileged access, 245 denial of transparency and incorrigibility, 245 overview, 11, 16 reductionism and, 438–39 frontopolar cortex and, 215, 220, 242 human agency, skepticism toward, 3–5, 7–9 Libet experiments data from, 217–21 determinism and, 231–33 epiphenomenal consciousness and, 237 epiphenomenal will and, 234 orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and, 557, 560–61 overconfidence in, 5–6 parietal cortex and, 170, 215, 220, 243, 295, 308 philosophy, skepticism toward, 6–7 prefrontal cortex (PFC) and, 297, 365–67, 559–61, 566 pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and, 215, 220 primary motor cortex and, 72, 215, 218 questions regarding challenges, 245–47 reductionism and (See also Reductionism) actions as brain-caused bodily movements, 451–58 challenges from, 11, 15, 207–17, 225–28, 244 dualism and, 461–63 eliminative materialism, 464 mental states as brain states, 458–61 metaphysical interpretation of data, 461–64 overview, 437–39, 450–51, 473–74 reductionist interpretations, 461 retributive justice, challenges to, 207–8 right lateral orbitofrontal cortex and, 365–67, 369–70 secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267 supplementary motor area (SMA) and determinism and, 231–33 Libet experiments and, 218, 220 limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with responsibility and, 417–19, 422–23, 430–31, 432 reductionism and, 215, 452, 456, 457–58, 463 tumors and, 368–69 ventromedial-orbitofrontal cortex and, 365–67 ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and, 365–67, 368 volitional excuse and, 364–71, 373 Wegner experiments, 221–25 Newcomb’s Problem, 423–25, 432 New conditionalist compatibilism apparent ability to do otherwise, 298–99 aversions, 300–1 classical compatibilism versus, 304–7 compulsive desires, 303 constitutive luck in having desires, 299–300 crazy desires and beliefs, 303–4 “finkish” dispositions, 299 “finkish” variations of obsessive desire/ aversion counterexamples, 301–3 infinite regress of choosing to choose to, 299 overview, 298 “sticky” versus “nonsticky” choices, 299 “unlucky” failures, 298 New Hampshire, medical model of legal insanity in, 145, 174–75, 197–98 “New Mysterians,” 59–62 Newton, Isaac, 446–47 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 273, 529 Nisbett, R.E., 221 Neuroscience (Cont.)Index 585 Nomological reductionism, 213 Nonanalytical hard determinism, 244 “Nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45 Norway Board of Forensic Medicine, 177 Commission on Forensic Medicine, 144–45 insanity law in (See Norway, insanity law in) Parliamentary Commission on Reform of the Insanity Laws of Norway, 143–44 Penal Code, 144–45n.3, 189–90, 193, 195, 198, 203n.185 Norway, insanity law in medical model of legal insanity in, 145 what can be improved, 199–202 cognitive impairments as rule of thumb only, 199–200 common-sense judgments, disguising of, 201–2 proper medical diagnosis as determinative, 199 psychiatrists, role of, 200–1 what is correct in, 197–99 limitation to very serious mental illness, 191, 198 mental illness not excusing criminal action, 197–98 moral relevance of mental illness, 197 psychosis, relationship with serious mental illness, 198–99 status defense, 198 Nozick, Robert, 210–11, 423, 424 Obligation, liability and, 43–44 Occasional libertarianism, 270 Odyssey (Homer), 541n.136 Olds, James, 539, 542, 544 Omission as counterexample to causal theory of action (CTA), 66–68 crimes of, 39 human agency and, 67–68n.47 Opioid addiction, 480–81 Oppenheim, Paul, 441–42 Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 557, 560–61 Oslo University, 143–44 “Overshoot” problem. See Volitional excuse Packer, Herbert, 275 Parietal cortex, 170, 215, 220, 243, 295, 308 Passionate intentionality, lack of, 97 Patchy libertarianism, 270–71 Paul (Saint), 343–44 Peel, Robert, 160, 164 Peerfield, Wilder, 72 Penfield, Wilder, 456 Pettit, Phil, 291, 299–300 Phenomenal awareness alleged epiphenomenal status of, 410 Libet experiments and, 390 as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 neuroscience, challenges from, 237–38f, 244 Philosophy, skepticism of neuroscience toward, 6–7 Physicalism classically reductionist physicalism, 441–43 componential mechanism, 448–49 eliminative materialism, 445–48 “grounding,” 449–50 “nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45 overview, 440–41 skeptical physicalism, 445–48 Pinker, Steven, 208–10 Pinkerton doctrine, 50 Plato, 182 Portugal, addiction as defense in, 478n.3 Posner, Richard, 29–30 Practical rationality schema of addiction, 490–97 immediate etiology of rational action, 491–93f, 493–95 prehistory of actions in terms of long-term causes, 490–91, 490–91f Preconscious actions, addiction and, 500–1, 519–20 Prefrontal cortex (PFC), 297, 365–67, 559–61, 566 Pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), 215, 220 Preventive justice, retributive justice versus, 1–3 Primary motor cortex, 72, 215, 218 Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), 267n.8, 267n.9, 282n.47, 287, 288, 290, 291, 300, 415–16 Privileged access fallibilism and, 245 Libet experiments and, 389–90 as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 moral agency, requirement for, 180 Property law, moral desert and, 210–11 Provocation as defense, 40–41, 322–23 Psychology blameworthiness and, 4–5 human agency and, 4–5 special part of criminal law compared, 27–28586 Index Psychosis madness, relation to, 191–97 psychiatric purposes in defining, 155–58 relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 174–78 Punishment insanity defense and mental disorder, 167–74 particular mental diseases, 166 psychosis, 174–78 strong relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 166–78 weak relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 158–66 mixed theory of, 19–20, 148 retributive justice addiction and, 569 challenges from neuroscience, 207–8 overview, 19–20, 147–48 preventive justice versus, 1–3 utilitarianism and, 209–10 theory of, 23–24 utilitarianism and, 3, 147–48 Putnam, Hilary, 123, 415, 441–42 Ramachandran, V.S., 392–93 Rangel, Antonio, 368, 372, 460 Rational choice model of addiction, 497–99 Ravizza, Mark, 309–10 Raz, Joseph, 31, 32, 34, 342–43n.77 Readiness Potential (RP), 218, 219, 219–20n.52, 220–21, 382, 383, 401, 404, 406, 417, 430–32 Reagan, Ronald, 144 Reciprocal innervation, 453–54 Reductionism analytical reductionism, 212–13 determinism and, 438–39 epiphenomenalism and, 438–39 fallibilism and, 438–39 metaphysical reductionism, 212–13 mind-brain metaphysical views as sources of challenge classically reductionist physicalism, 441–43 componential mechanism, 448–49 eliminative materialism, 445–48 “grounding,” 449–50 “nonreductionist” physicalism, 443–45 overview, 440–41 skeptical physicalism, 445–48 neuroscience and actions as brain-caused bodily movements, 451–58 challenges from, 11, 15, 207–17, 225–28, 244 dualism and, 461–63 eliminative materialism, 464 mental states as brain states, 458–61 metaphysical interpretation of data, 461–64 overview, 437–39, 450–51, 473–74 reductionist interpretations, 461 nomological reductionism, 213 responsibility, implications for dualism and, 466–68 framing of question, 465–66 reduction as demotion, 468–70 skeptical reductions and, 470–73 Reefer Madness (film), 547 Responsibility blameworthiness and, 90–91 epiphenomenalism, moral and legal relevance of claims of overview, 391–92 phenomenal awareness of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 397–98 privileged access of will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 394–97 will as merely epiphenomenal and not causal of bodily movements, 392–94 fictionalist responses to determinism and, 280–81 insanity defense and mental disorder, 167–74 particular mental diseases, 166 psychosis, 174–78 strong relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 166–78 weak relevance of medical definitions to excuse from responsibility and punishment, 158–66 intention and content of intention, suppositions regarding, 105–14 nature of intention, suppositions regarding, 98–105 role in assessment of, 87–89, 379–82 limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with ability to generally control past and, 426–28Index 587 control of strongly necessary and immediate past and, 429–34 denial of control of past and, 428–29 Newcomb’s Problem and, 423–25, 432 noncausal control of epiphenomenal forks, 420–25 overview, 15, 413–17 paralyzed patriot hypothetical, 422–25, 428–29, 432 responses to claims of non-cause-based control, 425–34 reductionism, implications of dualism and, 466–68 framing of question, 465–66 reduction as demotion, 468–70 skeptical reductionism and, 470–73 usages of, 89, 89f volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t Retributive justice addiction and, 569 challenges from neuroscience, 207–8 overview, 19–20, 147–48 preventive justice versus, 1–3 utilitarianism and, 209–10 Right lateral orbitofrontal cortex, 365–67, 369–70 Robinson, Paul, 515n.78 Rorty, Richard, 181n.116 Rosen, Gideon, 449, 528–29 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (UK), 178, 187 Rubicon Point, 219, 232–33, 385, 407 Rygnestad, Tarjei, 177 Ryle, Gilbert, 466–67 Sachs, Davis, 183n.125 Sapolsky, Robert, 1–3 Satel, Sally, 10, 11, 313–14 Sayre-McCord, Geoff, 471 Schaffer, Jonathan, 124, 449 Schelling, Thomas, 341–43 Schizophrenia, psychiatric purposes in defining, 150–52 Schlick, Moritz, 284, 309–10 Scholastics, 180–81 Secondary agency, 241–43, 245, 267 Secondary rules, 30 Selective determinism, insanity defense and, 172–73 Selective libertarianism, 272–73 Self-defense, 322–23 Sherrington, Charles, 213–14, 453–55, 462–63 Shoemaker, David, 426n.27 Simultaneity requirement, 103 Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 513n.73 Skeptical physicalism, 445–48 Skinner, B.F., 4–6, 15, 226–27, 411, 417, 438, 464, 464n.61, 470–71 Smith, Michael, 305–7, 309–10, 337–38, 358, 416 Snell’s Law, 441–42 Soerensen, Per Balch, 203n.184, 203n.186 Sorheim, Synne, 192, 193–94 Sorites Paradox, 447–48 Source compatibilism, 307–10 Special part of criminal law action and, 28–29 belief and, 28–29 deontic ethics and, 31–35 general part as descriptive theory of, 27–35 characteristics of, 36 “content-neutral” terms in special part, 27–30 criteria for, 35–41 moral aspect of, 31–35 overview, 23–24 possibility of, 35–41 general part versus, 21, 22–23 intention and, 28–29 psychology compared, 27–28 secondary rules and, 30 Specific intent versus general intent, 94–95, 117, 119–20 Sperry, Roger, 215–16n.39 Spitzer, Bob, 152, 153–54 Status excuses, volitional excuse and, 323 Staub, Hugo, 274–75 Stein, Alex, 467, 468 Stephens, James Fitzjames, 20–21, 37, 41 Steward, Helen, 68–70 Stewart, J., 542–43 Stewart, Potter, 485–86 Stich, Steven, 464n.60 Strawson, Peter, 270–71, 278–79, 280, 488–89 Strict liability offenses, 38–39 Sturgeon, Nicholas, 248 Substance use disorders, 480–81 Substitution rules, 110–11 Supervenience, 444–45 Supplementary motor area (SMA) determinism and, 231–33 Libet experiments and, 218, 220 limited compatibilism of epiphenomenalism with responsibility and, 417–19, 422–23, 430–31, 432 reductionism and, 215 Surgeon General, 477 Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), 524588 Index Synchronic weakness of will, 342–43, 348, 353, 507–8, 507n.64 Tadros, Victor, 318–19, 338 Talmud, 118, 127 Taylor, Richard, 61, 299–300 Thomson, Judith, 123 Tittle, Charles, 362–64 Torrissen, Terje, 192, 193–94 Tort law criminal law compared, 51 moral desert and, 210–11 transferred intent rule in, 113–14 Transferred intent rule, 113–14 Trump, Donald, 460n.49 United Kingdom, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 178, 187 University of Chicago, 174 University of Michigan, 539–40 Utilitarianism insanity defense and, 149 punishment and, 3, 147–48 retributive justice and, 209–10 Van Inwagen, Peter, 267n.9, 413 Ventromedial-orbitofrontal cortex, 365–67 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 365–67, 368 Veto function, 396–97n.37, 407–8 Victoria (UK), 144, 160, 186–87 Vihvelin, Kadri, 265–66, 274, 296, 302, 305, 307, 309–10, 416 Vincent, Nicole, 2–3 Volitional excuse cognitive excuse distinguished, 315, 317 conational excuse distinguished, 317–22 counterfactual conditionals to analyze incapacity in folk psychology models binary distinctions and, 355–57 counterfactual analysis of ability, 348–50 free action, 353–55 free will, 350–53 implications of possible worlds analysis, 355–60 nature of possible worlds analysis and, 357–60 relevant counterfactual for ability to act otherwise, 353–55 relevant counterfactual for ability to choose otherwise, 350–53 culpability and, 315–16, 315t dependence on “can’t/won’t” distinction actor could not have done otherwise, 324–27 domain of excuse, 314–17 domain of volitional excuse, 317–22 legal defenses involving, 322–23 underlying principle of volitional excuse, 324–27 experimental psychology, usefulness of, 361–64, 373 folk psychology of conflicting intentions, 332, 335–36 “ego-alien” desires and, 332–33, 337–40 inability to execute right intention, 340–45 inability to form right intention, 331–40 lack of intention, 332, 333–35 models of compelled choice and action, 345–48, 345t overview, 313–14, 327 psychology of conflicting desires where responsibility exists, 328–29 “sticky” intentions and, 342–43, 342–43n.77 strength of desire, 329–31 volitional incapacity and, 373 wishful thinking and, 332, 336–37 insanity defense and, 322–23 involuntary action distinguished, 315 irresistible impulse and, 323 justification distinguished, 315 “lack of fair opportunity” versus, 317–22 neuroscience, usefulness of, 364–71, 373 overview, 15, 313–14, 372 responsibility and, 315–16, 315t status excuses and, 323 ultraconservative interpretation, 324–27 ultraliberal interpretation, 324–27 volitional incapacity and, 373 wrongdoing and, 315–16, 315t Volitional incapacity, 373 Volkow, Nora, 550, 561 Wallace, Jay, 309–10 Ward, David, 362–64 Watson, Gary, 267 Wegner, Daniel, 221–25, 234, 236, 239–41, 240–41n.118, 500–1, 502 Wegner experiments, 221–25 White, Byron, 478–79 Willed stillness, 63 Williams, Glanville, 20–22, 37, 41, 53Index 589 Willpower, 354, 354n.90, 561–62, 561n.190 Wilson, T.D., 221 Wise, Roy, 539–40, 542–43, 545n.145, 554–55 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 482 The Wizard of Oz (film), 364–67, 371 World Health Organization, 151, 152, 192 Wrongdoing defense, confusion with, 568–69 intention and, 88 liability and, 44 volitional excuse and, 315–16, 315t Yaffe, Gideon, 13, 74, 76–85, 120–21, 122, 129–40, 134n.59, 136n.64, 137n.65, 138–39n.74, 513–14, 517–18n.80, 528n.94, 565–66n.194 Yokel, Robert, 539–40 Zimmerman, Michael, 31, 32, 528–29
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